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Abstract
The nuclear power community in the United States is moving to modernize aging power plant
control rooms as well as develop control rooms for new reactors. New generation control rooms,
along with modernized control rooms, will rely more heavily on automation and computerized
procedures. Of particular importance to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is the
impact such modernizations or new technologies will have upon operator performance and
reliability in these safety-critical control room environments. One specific area of interest is the
effect that various complexities in the control room have on operator performance and reliability.
This research identifies various definitions of complexity and characterizes complexity in the
nuclear power plant (NPP) domain, focusing on the common complexity dimensions of number,
variety, and interconnections. Based on this characterization of complexity, a comprehensive list
of complexity sources within the NPP control room is presented, along with a novel approach to
describe complexity source interconnections.
Understanding the sources of complexity in advanced NPP control rooms and the associated
effects on human reliability is critical for ensuring safe performance of both operators and the
entire system. However, most of the previous approaches in investigating complexity typically
focus on either objective or subjective views of complexity, and a systematic approach that
considers both views is missing from previous approaches. This research provides a novel
methodology to assess the sources of complexity in NPP control rooms both objectively and
subjectively while understanding the difference between the two and introduces a systems-
theoretic descriptive model of these sources of complexity, leveraging network theory. Finally a
method is introduced to investigate the differences between the complexity views of different
groups of NPP stakeholders.
Incident report databases and in particular, 22 nuclear incidents in the Human Event Repository
and Analysis (HERA) database were parsed to find objective evidence for the identified sources.
Using this evidence-based approach, some of the potential interactions between these sources
could be captured. A network called "Complexity Source Network" (CSN) was created for each
incident in HERA to present the sources (nodes) and potential interactions between them (links).
An ensemble of networks was developed consisting of 22 CSNs, one for each of the incidents in
HERA. A tool called CXViz was developed to visualize and analyze the CSNs. Using the
aggregate network (22 CSNs combined) the most common sources and interactions were
identified. The complexity views of three groups of stakeholders, namely Operators, Designers
and NRC Reviewers, were collected using a survey tool called CXSurvey. Using this tool, the
interviewees were asked to rate the identified sources of perceived complexity and to rank the
top five in terms of contribution to perceived complexity.
Data gathered from 16 operators, 8 designers and 3 NRC reviewers were collected and the top
five sources identified by each group were compared to the top five most supported sources from
the 22 incidents in HERA. The results show large variations between the subjective views of the
operators and designers and the objective top five. In addition, the subjective source rating of the
three groups of stakeholders were compared. The results show large variations between the
complexity views between the stakeholders on some controversial sources such as boredom, and
training.
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1. Introduction
1.1 Motivation
The nuclear power industry in the United States has declined in terms of growth since the Three
Mile Island (TMI) incident in 1979. After more than 30 years, the nuclear community is at a
stage where the need for more advanced and modem reactors is apparent. This imminent nuclear
"renaissance" is motivated by the need for increased work efficiency, component obsolescence,
international competition and increasing energy demand. As a result, the nuclear industry in the
United States, and specifically nuclear power plant (NPP) control rooms, are undergoing
extensive modernization. In addition, recent initiatives promise the construction of new and
advanced plants to be built over the next few years (Schmidt, 2010). The new reactors will have
advanced and computerized control rooms. The next-generation control rooms will have
different tools with different functionality, more automation and more dynamic information to
display. The type of information presentation has also changed from mechanical gauges and
analog panels to large screen and touch-screen digital displays (Figure 1).
Although advanced technologies may enable a more efficient working environment and provide
more functionality, they may introduce additional complexity to the NPP operations in general.
Although complexity has turned out to be a very difficult and abstract construct to define, a
general understanding of system complexity has something to do with interconnections between
parts. In addition, size and variety of system elements has an effect on human information
processing and hence could affect a control room being perceived as complex or not (see Chapter
2 for a discussion of complexity definitions).
Investigating the effects of control room modernization is important since personnel in such
environments must deal with increasing amounts of advanced technologies, such as large screen
and multiple displays. Unfortunately, the literature in the fields of Human-Computer Interaction
(HCI) and Human Factors (HF) lacks a clear description of sources that could contribute to
perceived complexity of the operators. Modern and computerized control rooms of the future
may challenge human operators' cognitive abilities by presenting information in complex ways.
It is critical that new reactor control rooms are designed and built with the cognitive needs of
operators at the forefront. Without proper understanding and management of the sources that
contribute to the complexity of control room environments, these sources may degrade human
performance. It is vital to understand the negative effects of complexity on human performance,
as human errors are not affordable in the NPP operations due to the safety-critical nature of such
operations.
Larg Dis ayPne
Shift supervisor console
Figure 1. A traditional control room (left)' vs. an advanced control room (right)2
1 Source: http://theragblog.blogspot.com
2 Source: http://www.mhi.co.jp/atom/hq/atome-e/apwr/04.html
Currently, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is responsible for the approval of new
control room designs. As a result, it is vital to provide the NRC staff with a technical basis to
understand the human performance effects of modernization changes and enable them to assess
the acceptability of new designs in terms of safety. One of the most important research topics
identified both by previous NRC research (O'Hara, 2009) and the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development Work Group of Human and Organizational Factors (NEA/CSNI,
2007), is "Human-System-Interface (HSI) complexity and opacity". These efforts identified the
need for further investigation of the limitations of human cognitive abilities and the effects of
information overload. Of particular interest in this domain is to understand that the sources of
complexity are essential factors in predicting human reliability in HSIs of NPP control rooms.
Although research in other similar domains such as aviation (e.g. Xing, 2004; Cummings &
Tsonis, 2006) shed some light on possible sources of display complexity, the exact nature of
these sources in the NPP domain needs further investigation.
1.2 Research Goals
The main objective of this research is to identify factors that contribute to complexity in existing
and advanced nuclear power plant systems and Human-System Interfaces. The addition of new
computerized systems to the NPP operations environment may have negative effects on human
performance due to added complexity. This research provides the building blocks for
understanding the sources that contribute to increased complexity and a major move towards
developing taxonomy of such sources. Regulatory agents such as the NRC's human factors
engineering reviewers could benefit from such taxonomy in their safety and licensing activities
for new and advanced control rooms.
1.3 Thesis Overview
This thesis is organized into the following chapters:
e Chapter 1, Introduction: Motivates the importance of understanding and investigating
sources that contribute to operators' perceived complexity in human supervisory control
domains. In particular, the introduction of next generation nuclear power plant control
rooms is discussed as a potential problem with regards to unknown nature of complexity
that the new technology provides.
- Chapter 2, Background: Reviews several definitions of complexity in the literature and
discusses the common features in these definitions. Two broad views on complexity are
discussed, objective and subjective complexity.
e Chapter 3, Complexity Investigation Model: Introduces a model to investigate complexity
both subjectively and objectively while looking at the difference between the two. The
Complexity Investigation Model also considers the difference between the complexity
views of the three groups of stakeholders: Operators, Designers and NRC Reviewers.
- Chapter 4, Methodology: Describes a 5-step iterative methodology to identify and
evaluate sources of complexity and potential interactions between them. The following
steps are discussed in detail: Step 1: identifying the complexity sources using a
combination of methods, Step 2: collecting objective evidence for the sources by
conducting a content analysis of 22 previous nuclear incidents, Step 3: representing the
potential interactions between the sources via a network representation, Step 4: collecting
subjective views of different stakeholder groups using a survey-interview method, and
Step 5: identifying variations between the objective complexity evidence and subjective
stakeholders views on complexity as well as differences between the complexity views of
different stakeholder groups.
e Chapter 5, Results: Discusses the analysis of variations between the objective evidence
and subjective complexity views of the stakeholder groups. In addition, a qualitative
analysis of the difference between the stakeholder views on several important sources of
perceived complexity is discussed. Finally, a qualitative analysis of interview-survey data
is discussed.
e Chapter 6, Discussion and Future Work: Describes the overall findings of this research
and proposes potential areas of research to complement and extend the work done in this
thesis.
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2. BACKGROUND
In order to provide a foundation to understand complexity in the context of NPP control rooms,
an extensive literature review of different disciplines was conducted. This chapter summarizes
the related literature, introduces several important complexity definitions and their common
features, and discusses several important research gaps.
2.1 Complexity Definitions
The term "complexity" comes from the Latin word "Complexus", which means, "to twine" as
defined in the Merriam-Webster dictionary (http://www.merriam-webster.com). Complexity is
defined in various ways across diverse disciplines and in relation to various systems. Although
several rich interpretations of complexity in different disciplines have been offered (Table 1), it
is still unclear what exactly makes a system "complex" and how this complexity and its effects
on human performance can be measured. This research gap is, in part, due to oversimplification
of scientific or philosophical explanations of real world phenomena or the so called "complexity
science" (Dent, 1999). Some of the most-used definitions of complexity are often tied to a
collection of inter-connected parts, or so called "systems". Some give emphasis to the
complexity of a system's behavior, while others focus on the internal structure of the system.
Table 1. Different definitions of complexity (modified from Xing & Manning, 2005)
SOURCE DEFINITION
General understanding (Xing & Size (of parts), variety (of parts) and
Manning, 2005) rules/interconnections (between the parts)
Algorithmic Complexity by Rouse and Computational complexity of the algorithm used to
Rouse (1979) solve the problem
Complexity by Drozdz (2002) A trinity of comprising coherence, chaos and a gap
between them
Complexity by Johnson (2007) Number and type of Parts and their interconnections,
System's memory and feedback, The relationship
between the system and environment is non-linear,
the system can adapt itself according to its history
Kolmogorov complexity (Casti 1979) Minimum description size
Weaver complexity (1948) The difficulty of predicting the properties of the
system, given the properties of the parts
Effective Measure Complexity The amount of information that must be stored in
(Grassberger 1986) order to make an optimal prediction about the next
symbol to the level of granularity
Topological complexity The minimal size of the automaton that can
Crutchfield and Young (1989) statistically reproduce the observed data within a
specified tolerance
Simon's complexity (1962) Near-decomposable hierarchic structure
Complexity by Langton (1991) Level of mutual information, which measures the
correlation between information at sites separated by
time and space
Bennett logical depth (Bennett 1990) Computational cost (time and memory) taken to
calculate the shortest process that can reproduce a
given object
Hieratical complexity (Bates and Number of local states, dimensionality and rule-
Shepard 1993) range
Cyclomatic complexity (McCabe 1976) Difference of the total number of transitions and the
total number of states
Edmonds's complexity (Edmonds 1999) The difficulty to formulate an overall behavior with
given atomic components and their inter-relations
Cognitive complexity (Crokett 1965) The entities of differentiation, articulation and
hierarchic integration
Bieri's index of cognitive complexity Number of constructs and matches between the
(Bieri 1955) constructs
Relational complexity (Halford et al. The number of interacting variables that must be
1998) presented in parallel to perform a process entailed in
a task
Kauffman complexity (Kauffman 1993) Number of conflicting constraints
In many of these definitions, however, complexity in the context of HSI contains several
common components. In particular, complexity has been defined in terms of three separate
dimensions within a particular system: quantity, variety, and interconnections (Xing and
Manning, 2005; Xing, 2007). Quantity refers to the number of items in a certain part of the
system. This quantity could be, in the context of HSI in NPP control rooms, the number of
displays in the control room, the number of buttons on a control panel, number of icons on a
particular display, or the number of sub-systems within an overall system. Variety is the number
of different components in the system. Variety could refer to the number of different kinds of
buttons on an NPP control panel, the number of different colors in a particular display, the
number of different size displays, or the number of different types of pumps in a system.
Interconnections describe the links between components of a system. Although size and variety
(of elements) are measurable in a given system, interconnections can be difficult to quantify in
the system, unless all system states are known. For instance, increasing the temperature of water
in a holding tank could cause an automatic increase in the flow rate from the tank to a heat
exchanger. This "cause and effect" type of interconnection is just one example of the various
couplings and links that can occur in a given system, and thus they are inherent to the notion of
complexity. Perrow (1999) explains complexity in terms of interactions among subsystems (from
linear to complex) and coupling of parts (from loose to tight). Perrow argues that our systems
have become so complex and tightly coupled that accidents are inevitable and are considered
"normal". He defines linear systems as systems in which interaction between the parts are
expected in a sequence. This is in contrast with complex systems in which the interactions
between the parts are unexpected.
This generic description of complexity is useful to understand the basis of the variety of
complexities that have been identified in the literature. As shown in Table 1, nearly all the
complexities in the literature are defined in terms of quantity, variety, and interconnections,
though the measurement of these components is highly dependent on the domain. For the
purposes of this research, I shall define complexity of a system simply as the number and variety
of system elements, and the number of interconnections between them.
2.2 Objective Complexity
Broadly stated, complexity in NPP control rooms could be explained both objectively and
subjectively. "Objective complexity", also known as "descriptive complexity" (Schlindwein and
Ison, 2004), has been defined as an inherent property of a system or the environment surrounding
a system. This objectivist view of complexity is dominant among scientific communities, and is
responsible for most of the quantitative attempts to measure complexity. Proponents of this
ideology argue that the characteristics of complex systems are not merely what humans perceive;
there exists an objective reality for each system independent of the observer (e.g., Cilliers, 1998;
Rescher, 1998).
Although a vast amount of objective data are potentially available from NPP control rooms,
derivation of a meaningful and reliable list of factors that may contribute to the complexity of
such systems is missing from the existing research. One approach to investigate the objective
sources of complexity in the NPP control room environments is to study and analyze real world
incidents. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) maintains several incident report
databases that could be used as plausible resources to discover the systematic factors or sources
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of complexity, including human error, which led to previous accidents. This concept is further
explored in Chapter 4. One of the limitations of this approach is the influence of the subjective
views of the humans involved in preparation of such incident reports. This makes the data from
incident reports quasi-objective. Earl Babbie (2010) posits: "Objectivity is a conceptual attempt
to get beyond our individual views. It is ultimately a matter of communication, as you and I
attempt to find a common ground in our subjective experiences." (p. 42). Although there is some
subjectivity involved in how these reports are created, the data from incident report databases are
arguably a plausible resource to reflect objective reality, or what Babbie calls the "Agreement
Reality", since such reports are subject to significant review and regulatory agency endorsement.
2.3 Subjective Complexity
Alternatively, "subjective complexity" describes complexity as the unique understanding of a
phenomenon by a human observer. In other words, complexity is dependent on human
perception; thus, each person in the nuclear power industry has a different interpretation of
complexity based on his or her mental model. This epistemological view of complexity is also
known as "perceived complexity." For proponents of this view (e.g., Le Moigne, 1990; Casti,
1995; Martinez, 2001), complexity is an inherently subjective concept. Intuitively, perceived
complexity of a complex environment, such as a NPP control room, could be correlated with the
operator's performance. Previous research shows that increased perceived complexity of the
system in supervisory control environments, such as air traffic control, can reduce operator
performance (Xing, 2004; Cummings et al., 2008).
For the purposes of subjective complexity data gathering in this research, three broad categories
of NPP stakeholders were identified based on the assumption that each group represents a
homogenous view of complexity (this assumption is discussed in Chapter 6). The stakeholder
groups identified were: 1) Control room operators or the end users, 2) Original Equipment
Manufacturers (OEMs), or the designers, and 3) NRC design reviewers that represent the
regulatory body. These key stakeholders are mostly responsible for the design, acquisition and
operation of NPP control rooms, and therefore, play an important role in complexity of the
control rooms. Therefore, it is important to ensure that their views on the effect of complexity on
human performance matches the objective reality reflected by previous NPP accidents and
incidents.
2.4 Objective vs. Subjective Complexity
An historical analysis of complexity literature shows that strategies for studying complexity are
not comprehensive enough and complexity distinctions are, in some sense, biased through either
the objective or subjective outlook particular researchers adopt regarding complexity
(Schlindwein and Ison, 2004). A more systematic approach, which takes into account the
interconnections between the observer and the observed, is missing from existing approaches. A
complete separation of object and subject will result in an inconclusive complexity knowledge
base (Ciurana, 2004). Understanding complexity should involve a trans-disciplinary
investigation of both system properties as well as the stakeholders' views of complexity.
In conclusion, the review of the complexity literature presented in this chapter showed the
connection of three important concepts to system complexity: size or number of parts, variety of
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parts, and interactions between them. This chapter also discussed the two dominant views on
complexity: objective complexity and subjective complexity, and motivated the importance of
considering both in understanding and investigating complexity. The next chapter introduces a
holistic model to guide the investigation of complexity in human-supervisory control systems,
which considers both the objective evidence from the past incidents and the subjective views of
several stakeholder groups as well as the difference between the two. Using the model, several
fundamental research questions are raised.
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3. COMPLEXITY INVESTIGATION MODEL
Understanding and measuring sources of complexity both subjectively and objectively is an
essential step in systematic conceptualization and operationalization of complexity as an abstract
construct. We hypothesize that stakeholder groups may have constructed an unrealistic or an
incomplete mental model of the factors that make a control room complex. This
misunderstanding might affect their behaviors and eventually the technologies they design,
approve or manipulate. As a result, a mismatch between the perceptions of operators, control
room designers and NRC reviewers regarding the effects of complexity and the actual objective
data about the effects of complexity of control rooms (shown as "A" in Figure 2) could be
problematic. A differential in complexity mental models introduces additional uncertainty to the
system, which could result in increased operator errors, ineffective designs and risky acquisition
decisions. Understanding these potential discrepancies is essential for designers and evaluators,
as synchronizing the perceived complexity of different stakeholders and the actual complexity in
the contextual domain in a reductionist manner may lead to designs that could be less prone to
risk.
As shown in Figure 2, incident report databases such as Human Event Repository and Analysis
(HERA), Licensee Event Report (LER) and Human System Information System (HSIS), could
be used as plausible resources to gather objective evidence for the sources that contributed
negatively to the perceived complexity of the operators in previous incidents. Such objective
evidence then could be compared to the subjective views of the stakeholders to identify potential
disparities.
OBJECTIVE or DESCRIPTIVE SUBJECTIVE or PERCEIVED
INCIDENT DATABASES OPERATORS
DESIGNERS REVIEWERS
A: Difference between Objective data and Subjective views
6 : Difference between Subjective views of different groups
Figure 2. Complexity investigation model. The differences between subjective complexity and
objective complexity ("A"). Differences between complexity views of the control room design
stakeholders ("8")
3.1 Conflicts in Stakeholder Complexity Views
As discussed in the previous section, three broad groups of stakeholders were identified based on
the important role they play with regards to complexity of the system: Operators, control room
Designers and NRC Reviewers. Operators are highly trained controllers in charge of monitoring
the health and status of the reactors. Operators are considered the end-user of the control room
system. Mitigating the negative effects of the perceived complexity of the control rooms on their
performance is the ultimate goal of this research. Designers are in charge of the design and
architecture of NPP control rooms. Designers are considered key stakeholders since their design
decisions will directly affect the structural and functional complexity of the control rooms. NRC
reviewers are safety experts who review reactor designs in order to identify major safety and
technical issues. Reviewers play an important role as an interface between the operators and
designers by evaluating the aspects of the design that might hinder operator performance.
One of the hypotheses of this research is that the NPP stakeholder groups could have different
mental models of NPP control rooms and, hence, their perceived complexity of such complex
systems differs. Without understanding such intra-organizational imbalances in complexity
views, it is questionable whether safety measures will guarantee system safety. To date, no
guidelines or methodologies have been developed to systematically investigate these complexity
differences. This research proposes a novel method to 1) help understand the aspects of a control
room that make it complex, 2) to investigate imbalances between objective and subjective
complexities in relation to human performance, and 3) to examine three different intra-
organizational comparisons between different stakeholders, namely operators-designers,
designers-reviewers and reviewers-operators (shown as "6" in Figure 2). These pairwise
comparisons are explained below:
Operator-Designer: Previous research implicates human error as the main causal factor for
almost 70% of accidents in safety-critical systems (Stanton et al., 2010). Although extensive
programs are in place to review the safety of new control rooms, it is still not clear which aspects
of a control room contribute to increasing perceived complexity and how this complexity affects
an operator's performance. On the other hand, control room designers are responsible for
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identifying the error potentials in the design process and are required to conform to the NRC's
design and human factors standards (O'Hara et al., 2004). Therefore, designers should adopt
strategies to identify complexity-induced human error potentials within the system and mitigate
sources that exacerbate perceived complexity. Large discrepancies in complexity views of
control room designers and operators is a serious issue, which would demonstrate that users'
perceived complexity is not properly understood. Hence, some of the potential sources for
human error may not be considered in the design. In other words, without understanding the
sources that contribute to operators perceiving the control room as complex, designers are merely
designing control rooms based on their own mental models of complexity. The effects of such
disparity is apparent in the Three Mile Island incident in which ambiguous control room
instruments and indicators resulted in the failure of plant operators to recognize the problematic
situation (i.e., operators were not aware of a stuck-open pilot-operated relief valve (PORV) that
caused a large amount of coolant to escape). The propagation of effects was compounded by
large amount of irrelevant, misleading or incorrect information presented to the operators
(Kemeny, 1979).
Designer-Reviewer: The NRC's responsibility is not only to protect the health and safety of the
public and environment by ensuring that adequate training is provided to operation staff, but also
to regulate the design of the new power plants. Designs of new control rooms undergo an
extensive Human Factors Engineering (HFE) review in which the applicant's HFE program
would be verified against accepted HFE practices and guidelines. In order to support the review
and licensing of advanced reactor designs, the NRC has adopted an anticipatory design research
approach to understand safety issues that might evolve in future designs. In this approach, the
NRC uses so called "Surrogates" which are similar advanced control rooms from different
domains (e.g. process control) to build technical guidelines that facilitate the design review
process for future designs. Differences in complexity views between designers and reviewers is
problematic because, without knowing how control room designers think about complexity, the
NRC's regulatory decision-making efforts are less informed and may result in risky acquisitions.
In addition, a mutual understanding of the control room features that affect complexity bolster
collaboration between OEMs and the NRC, making the mutual expectations more transparent.
Reviewer-Operator: As part of human factors Verification and Validation (V&V), NRC
reviewers evaluate the design of the control rooms to verify that the design accommodates
human abilities and limitations using the guidelines documented in NRC's Human-System
Interface Design Review Guideline or NUREG-0700 (O'Hara et al., 2002). However, NUREG-
0700 doesn't provide any guidelines with regards to perceived human complexity.
Understanding the differences between complexity views of the NPP operation staff and NRC
reviewers is essential in developing comprehensive HFE review guidelines in which the effects
of complexity on human performance are incorporated.
Such pairwise comparisons shed some light on intra-organizational conflicts in complexity
views. This information is vital in developing design standards and guidelines that consider
human cognitive limitations with regards to perceived complexity. In addition, potential
disparities in complexity views of stakeholders show the need for developing a standard
framework for thinking about such an important issue and potential policies to align such views.
3.2 Research Questions
As discussed in the previous sections, understanding the sources of complexity in the context of
the nuclear power plant control rooms is critical given the modernization of current plants and
the addition of new plants. In addition, the disparities between different stakeholder complexity
views (i.e., subjective complexity), and the actual world complexity (i.e., objective complexity)
as well between-group differences in complexity views needs to be investigated further. This
leads to three fundamental research questions (also see Figure 3):
1. What factors contribute to the complexity of an NPP control room and more generally, in
Human Supervisory Control (HSC) systems?
2. Are there large variations between objective complexity data and subjective complexity
views, and what are the implications?
3. Are there large variations between the operators, designers and regulators views on
complexity, and what are the implications?
In order to address the above-mentioned research questions, next chapter introduces a novel
methodology to identify potential sources of perceived complexity, collect objective evidence for
the identified sources, collect subjective complexity views from the stakeholders, and to identify
variations between the objective evidence and the subjective stakeholder views. The method also
considers the intra-organizational differences between the stakeholder groups' complexity views.
OBJECTIVE or DESCRIPTIVE SUBJECTIVE or PERCEIVED
OPERATORS
RQ2 DESIGNERS REVIEWERS
Figure 3. Research questions (RQl: research question 1, etc.) embedded in the complexity
investigation model
RQ1
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4. METHODOLOGY
In order to address the abovementioned questions, this research introduces a 5-step iterative
methodology (Figure 4) to investigate important sources of complexity in the NPP control
environment that have an impact on human performance both objectively and subjectively, while
examining the difference between the two. Interconnections between sources are reviewed to
further understand the overall complexity of NPP systems. In addition, different categorizations
of complexity are introduced to better organize various aspects of complexity. Each of the steps
in the methodology will be reviewed in detail in the following sections.
1. Identify
Sources
- Triangulation
* SME Opinion
2. Objective
Validation
Incident Report Databases
Content Analysis
3. Identify
Interactions Complexity Source Networks (CSN)
4. Subjective
Validation
- Survey-Interview
- CXSurvey
5. Identify
Variations
A: Difference between Objective data and Subjective views
5 : Difference between Subjective views of different groups
Figure 4. Complexity investigation methodology
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4.1 Step 1: Identification of Complexity Sources
One of the most important goals of this research is to identify the factors that contribute to
complexity in NPP control rooms (research question 1). In order to identify potential sources of
complexity in NPP control rooms in the United States, a triangulation method was used which
incorporated multiple methods. First, literature was reviewed for empirical evidence for the
existence of such sources in similar domains. In particular, previous research in the field of
aviation provided insight on potential sources of perceived complexity in air traffic control
(ATC) control rooms (e.g. Xing & Manning, 2005; Cummings & Tsonis, 2006; Xing, 2007).
Next, a field study at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) nuclear reactor was
conducted, including extensive interviews with reactor personnel. Next, plant operations at
several different facilities were observed, including the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, the NRC
Technical Training Center (TTC) simulator and the New York Independent Systems Operator
(NYISO) electricity distribution control room. In addition, an online questionnaire was designed
to obtain data from operators in terms of what they perceived as contributors to their job
complexity (Cummings et al., 2010, Appendix A). Finally, several subject matter experts
(SMEs) experienced in nuclear operations were identified and interviewed to offer their opinion
on sources of complexity. The qualitative analysis of gathered data led to the generation of an
initial list of complexity sources in NPP control rooms (see Appendix B. 1). The next step in the
methodology is to collect objective evidence for the identified sources, which is discussed in the
next section.
4.2 Step 2: Objective Validation
In order to gather objective evidence for the identified sources and their effects on human
performance (research question 2), several NRC-maintained incident databases, including
Licensee Event Reports (LER), Human Factors Information System (HFIS), and in particular,
Human Event Repository and Analysis (HERA) were parsed for complexity-related operator
mistakes and errors.
4.2.1 Content analysis of HERA
HERA is an incident report database designed to make available empirical human performance
as well as system fault data from 22 commercial nuclear plant incidents. The HERA database
was originally designed by NRC researchers to support their Human Reliability Analysis (HRA)
research. Therefore, the incidents in HERA were chosen based on the availability and the quality
of information as potential HRA data sources. In particular, the initial extraction of data into
HERA has focused on four groups of incidents: Events involving emergency diesel generators,
events involving initiating events, events involving common-cause failures, and events with
significant risk of conditional core damage probability (CCDP) (see NUREG/CR-6903 for a
discussion of selection criteria). Each incident in HERA is broken down into hundreds of sub-
events that provide the chronological sequence of human, equipment and off-plant sub-events.
HERA uses sub-event codes to categorize the negative or positive effects of the sub-events (see
Table 2).
Table 2. The HERA Sub-event Codes (Hallbert et al., 2006)
Negative Outcome Positive Outcome Contextual Info
Human XHE HS CI
Plant XEQ EQA PS
External EE EE EE
Where,
- XHE-represents a human error (HE) that potentially contributes to the fault (X). An XHE
is a human action or inaction that:
- Occurs within the boundary of the nuclear steam supply system (NSSS) and balance of
plant (BOP) systems; AND
- Is unsafe; OR
- Potentially negatively affects plant, system, equipment availability, operability, and
consequences; OR
- Represents circumvention with negative impact.
- HS-represents a successful human action or inaction that potentially has a positive effect
on the event outcome. HS is a human action or inaction that:
- Occurs within the boundary of the NSSS and BOP systems; AND
- Potentially positively affects plant, system, equipment availability, operability, and
consequences; AND
e Represents activities that are not purely routine and that go beyond normal job
expectations; OR
* Represents a recovery action; OR
e Represents circumvention with positive impact.
- CI-represents contextual information about the human action or inaction. It is any human
action or inaction that isn't classified as an XHE or HS. Specifically, CI is a human action or
inaction that:
e Is associated with design errors or improper guidance; OR
e Takes place outside the NSSS and BOP systems; OR
- Is an engineering function including onsite engineering; OR
- Represents expected human actions in response to the situation; OR
- Encompasses conversations and notifications.
- XEQ-represents an equipment failure (EQ) that potentially contributes to the fault (X).
- EQA-represents successful equipment actuation that potentially has a positive effect on
the event outcome.
- PS-represents information about the plant state that helps to explain the equipment
failure, actuation, or other noteworthy factors pertaining to plant health or transients.
- EE-represents events external to the plant such as extreme weather, external fires, seismic
events, or transmission system events.
An enormous amount of detailed information regarding each sub-event, including the event
summary, key human performance insights provided by HERA coders and accident
investigators, as well as a timeline of events, makes possible a systematic analysis to identify a
chronological progression of human actions, inactions and interactions within the plants. Such
strong deconstructionism (i.e., in terms of creating the chain of events) and dualism (i.e., looking
at both human and system faults) (Dekker, 2005) qualities make HERA a valuable resource for
gathering objective complexity data for control rooms, specifically in reference to human
performance.
Three evaluators (two undergraduate, and one graduate student at MIT) parsed HERA for the
existence of evidence to support the identified sources of complexity as well as to identify new
sources based on the incident reports data. The 22 incidents in the HERA database include two
types of events: near misses (narrowly avoided catastrophic situations) or minor events, such as a
small atmospheric release of radioactive effluents. Each event was carefully examined and
parsed, resulting in a large collection of individual actions taken before, during, and after the
event. Each particular action was coded according to conventional probabilistic risk assessment
(PRA) methods (Halbert et al., 2006). Each of the 22 events in the HERA database was
examined for the performance-shaping factor (PSF) class of complexity. Each of the PSFs that
were coded as a human error (XHE) or human success (HS) due to complexity were examined
and recorded (Appendix C). Two particular factors occurred quite frequently: "Simultaneous
tasks with high attention demands" and "Problems in differentiating important from less
important information". These factors translated to sources of complexity concerning parallel
tasks and procedures and can also be related to several sources within the interface complexity
category.
An inter-coder reliability assessment was performed to ensure consistency between the three
evaluators (Lombard et al., 2002). The result of the inter-coder reliability assessment showed
85% agreement in the identified source evidences and the inconsistent source evidence instances
were removed from the evidence database. Although content analysis is very useful for
analyzing historical data and is promising to collect plausibly objective evidence for complexity
sources, it suffers from several limitations. Firstly, the analysis is limited by the availability of
material. The HERA database is by no means a collectively exhaustive set of nuclear incidents in
the United States. Secondly, although the analysis is geared toward producing objective evidence
for the complexity sources, the data included in the HERA database are exposed to the
subjectivity of the HERA coders. In particular, the inferential procedures followed by the initial
HERA coders are not well documented.
The qualitative content analysis of the incident report databases, and in particular the 22
incidents in HERA, resulted in an evidence database that holds a collection of sub-event codes
for different incidents that support the existence of particular complexity sources. As shown in
Figure 5, the first column in the database lists the sources of complexity identified using the
methods previously discussed. The remaining columns represent data from a specific incident in
HERA. Each cell contains sub-event codes (Table 2) that support the existence of a complexity
source. The terminology HERA uses is commonly used in the HRA and probabilistic risk
analysis (PRA) communities and was generated by NRC research staff (Hallbert et al., 2006). As
previously discussed, each incident in HERA is subdivided into hundreds of sub-events that
provide the timeline of events. As shown in Table 2, each sub-event was coded based on the type
of information it contains and is sequentially numbered (e.g., XHE 1, XHE 2, etc.). For example,
as shown in Figure 5, four types of sub-events were used to support "available time" in the
"Browns Ferry 1" incident: 12 successful human actions (HS) sub-events, 2 contextual
information (CI) sub-events, 12 human error or fault (XHE) sub-events, and 2 plant state (PS)
sub-events.
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Figure 5. Complexity source evidence database
Although HERA provides a vast amount of information for each incident, a systematic
investigation of these incidents that considers the interactions between the system components is
missing in HERA. In order to address this issue, a Systems-Theoretic Accident Modeling and
Processes (STAMP) analysis can be conducted on the incidents in HERA. STAMP is a causality
I g-.,_ Iu1
model based on systems theory (Leveson, 1995; 2009). STAMP analysis goes beyond
identifying direct system failures or human error and looks at identifying the main stakeholders
within the hierarchical control structure and how the interaction between the actions or inactions
of these stakeholders contributes to the incidents under investigation. Due to time and resource
limitations only one STAMP analysis was conducted on the Salem Unit 1 incident, which has the
largest number of interconnections (Appendix D). The STAMP analysis resulted in identification
of some of systematic factors that contributed to the incident under investigation and revealed
several additional sources of complexity (Appendix B.2).
In summary, an evidence-based approach was used to provide evidence for and to validate the
identified sources of complexity objectively using a systematic analysis of previous incidents.
This resulted in an evidence database that could be used for objective validation of sources. As
discussed in Chapter 2, identifying interactions between the subparts or events in complex
systems is overly challenging. The next section describes a method to identify some of the
potential interactions between the sources of complexity in nuclear incidents.
4.3 Step 3: Identification of Interactions
4.3.1 Network Models
NPPs are complex socio-technical systems with many discrete parts, which are not uniformly
connected. The existence of human operators as part of the system creates additional
interrelations between the sub-parts of the system and humans, and introduces more uncertainty.
For such complex systems, understanding the building blocks is not enough to understand the
overall system. For that reason many classical models fail to accurately represent such systems.
Network theory is an established field of research and is considered one of the forerunners of the
complex systems research (Wasserman, 1994; Newman, 2010). Using this theory, graphs are
used to represent real world phenomenon and more specifically, to represent the asymmetric
relationship between the parts of a system.
A popular theory among complexity scientists is that the number of individual components and
their connections has been described as a direct measure of complexity (Edmonds, 1995), which
makes network theory an excellent candidate to represent and analyze complex systems.
Network theory provides tools to deal with many nodes and their structural and statistical
properties. When a system is represented as a network, network theory provides insight on the
shape of the networks (e.g., the form of overall interaction), their growth (e.g., how did the
interactions between the sources emerge over time), connectivity (e.g., how easily the negative
effects propagates through the network), and robustness (e.g., identifying the critical nodes/links
without which the network loses its connectivity significantly).
Overall, the concept of complexity versus simplicity can be understood in the context of
networks. Usually complexity of the network is attributed to the number of nodes and
interconnections between them. For example, a fully connected network (a network in which all
the nodes are connected to each other) with 200 nodes is considered more complex than a
network with 100 nodes that are not all connected with links. By presenting complex systems as
networks, the problem of reducing (or increasing) complexity becomes more straightforward
(e.g. reducing/increasing the number of nodes/links). Network theory also provides answers to
some important questions with regards to complexity such as what makes some nodes more
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connected than the others. What are the areas of high cohesive connectivity (these are groups of
nodes that are highly connected)? How can we reduce/increase the overall connectivity of the
network? How do networks emerge over time or during different phases of operation? The next
section introduces a network to represent sources of complexity and their interconnections
4.3.2 Complexity Source Networks
The identification of interactions between the sources of complexity is important in order to
understand the overall complexity of the NPP control room environment. Due to the richness of
incident information included in the HERA database, the interconnections between NPP sources
of complexity can be represented and explored via a network representation. A Complexity
Source Network (CSN) was used to represent the identified sources of complexity and their
interrelations for each incident (Figure 6). In a CSN, nodes represent sources of complexity and
links between two nodes represent the interactions between the sources. These interactions are
captured as the co-occurrence of those sources within a single sub-event in a particular incident.
For example, as shown in Figure 7, since the complexity sources "Number of external
interruptions" and "Number of parallel procedures" were identified as the contributors to the
sub-event "XHE12" (i.e., the twelfth human fault-related sub-event) in the Salem 1 incident, the
two nodes are connected with a link (see Appendix E for complete set of CSNs for 22 incidents
included in HERA).
As discussed in section 4.2, when a source is identified to be a contributor to a sub-event in an
incident in HERA, that sub-event code (e.g., XHE12, HSl, etc.) is used as the evidence for the
existence of that source and is collected in an evidence database (Figure 5). The weight for a
node in a CSN corresponds to the total number of evidences (i.e., sub-event codes) collected in a
particular cell in the evidence database that corresponds to that source (i.e., node) for the incident
under investigation. For example, since 10 sub-event codes were collected to support the source
"Number of external interruptions" for the Salem 1 incident, the weight 10 was assigned to its
corresponding node. On the other hand, the weight for a link between two nodes in a CSN
corresponds to the number of common sub-event codes between those two nodes. For example,
since there are 7 common sub-events to support both "Number of external interruptions" and
"Number of parallel procedures" (i.e., XHE 12, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 and HS2), the weight 7 was
assigned to the link connecting the two (Figure 7). As shown in Figure 6 and 7, the nodes were
color coded to show four different levels of complexity: environmental complexity (green),
organizational complexity (red), interface complexity (blue), and cognitive complexity (black).
These categories are part of a so-called Human-Supervisory Control (HSC) complexity chain,
which is discussed in the next section.
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Figure 7. Interaction between the two sources of complexity "Number of external interruptions"
and "Number of parallel procedures" in the Salem Unit 1 incident
4.3.3 Human Supervisory Control Complexity Chain
The CSN was organized via a Human Supervisory Control (HSC) complexity chain (Cummings
and Tsonis, 2006) (Figure 8). The HSC chain identifies environmental complexity as the
objective state of complexity that exists in the world and cognitive complexity as the complexity
perceived by a human operator. In the case of a complex environment tPPs, for example),
perceived complexity could be quite high, potentially negatively impacting safe operator
performance. For example, many NPPs have redundant systems for safety reasons. However,
including a redundant system could double the amount of information available to the operator
(including displays and controls), which could increase an operator's cognitive complexity. To
mitigate cognitive complexity, organizational policies and procedures along with information
representations in the form of interfaces and displays, can be introduced into the system.
However, the introduction of these mitigations and devices also can add to the overall perceived
complexity of the operator.
In a CSN, organizational complexity represents the additional constraints placed upon the system
by operational requirements, such as the number of crewmembers in the control room,
emergency procedures, or shift length. The original HSC complexity chain (Figure 8) contained
a display complexity category, which considered the complexities offered by visualizations
found in displays, including visual, aural, and haptic. This interpretation only recognizes the
output to the operator, with no consideration of input from the operator to the system, which is
required to close the supervisory control loop. Thus, we propose to change display complexity in
the original HSC complexity chain (Cummings & Tsonis, 2006) to interface complexity, to
reflect this two-way communication. Interface complexity is the complexity derived from
controls and displays, which could include display font size, number of colors used in the
display, or numbers and variety of buttons, levers, etc. Figure 9 shows the CSN embedded in the
HSC complexity chain.
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Figure 8. HSC Complexity Chain (modified from Cummings and Tsonis, 2006)
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Figure 9. Complexity source network embedded in HSC complexity chain
Using the HSC complexity chain, the effect of different layers of complexity on the overall
network can be analyzed. For example, Figure 10 illustrates the effects of removing the
organizational complexity layer from the CSN corresponding to North Anna unit 1 incident.
Theoretically mitigating organizational complexity sources in this case would reduce the
complexity of the network significantly (e.g. a reduction of links from 217 to 57). In addition to
providing organizational structure, presenting the network in the HSC complexity chain
framework allows researchers the ability to see what sources of complexity are inherent to the
system (i.e., environmental), and less likely to be addressed directly as opposed to those sources
more easily addressed, such as difficult procedures.
4.3.4 Network Information Visualization and Analysis
Network visualization is an important technique to understand and convey the result of the
analysis of networks (Freeman, 2006). A network visualization and analysis tool called CXViz
(Complexity Visualization) was developed to visualize the CSNs for all the incidents included in
the HERA database. The CXViz interface has 3 main sections (Figure 11): 1) a visualization
window that displays the identified sources of complexity within the Human HSC complexity
chain (Cummings and Tsonis, 2006), 2) a vertical toolbar that provides several analytic
functionalities and visualization tools, and 3) a database window that allows the user to interact
with the evidence database. CXViz facilitates the identification of the main contributors to
complexity of each CSN (i.e. nodes/links with highest weights and nodes with high number of
connections, the so-called node degree). Network theory enables the measurement and
evaluation of characteristics of the resulting networks, which allows for comparison of CSNs,
identification of emergent patterns, investigation of how the CSNs emerge over time and
investigation of aggregate networks. These sections are explained in more detail in Appendix F.
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Figure 11. CXViz visualizing the CSN for Browns Ferry unit 1 accident
4.3.5 Network Characteristics
CXViz also provides several important network statistics with regards to complexity that
facilitate the network analysis process. The complexity of a network is usually characterized by
its non-trivial structure. In particular, "connectivity" can provide insight into the complexity of a
network. Connectivity of a network is defined as the ability to find a path from each node to
other nodes in the network. Using CSNs as an analytical approach in identifying the interactions
between the sources, we propose a reductionist approach to mitigate the propagation effect of
interactions between the sources of complexity by reducing the connectivity of the network. The
following connectivity metrics are currently measured and reported for each CSN:
Network Density (ND): ratio of number of links to number of potential links. Network Density is
an important measure for connectivity of the network. In the context of CSNs, a smaller density
means fewer links and according to Edmonds' (1995) definition of complexity (the number of
interconnections could be used as the direct measure of complexity), reducing network density
reduces the complexity of the network.
Characteristic Path Length (CPL): CPL is an important measure of network connectivity. It is
calculated as the average of all the shortest paths between pairs of nodes. Ideally the CPL of
CSNs should be large which means less connectivity is desired (Braha and Bar-Yam, 2004).
Clustering Coefficient (CC): The total number of actual connections between a node's neighbors
over the potential connections between those neighbor nodes. CC is the measure of modularity.
Usually a high CC is desirable for systems in which better flow is preferred, however, in order to
reduce the connectivity of CSNs, a low CC is desired (Braha and Bar-Yam, 2004).
For example, the network characteristics for two different incidents are analyzed (Figure 12):
Salem Unit 1 and Browns Ferry Unit 1. In the Salem Unit 1 incident, complications from river
grass intrusion lead to an automatic reactor trip, two automatic safety injections, a manually
initiated main steam isolation, and a discretionary declaration of alert. A combination of several
unusual events resulted in several human-fault related sub-events and eventually the plant
shutdown. On the other hand, in Browns Ferry Unit I incident, a candle-induced cable fire in the
cable spreading room and Unit 1 reactor building resulted in the reactor shutdown. As shown in
Figure 12, Salem 1 CSN is more connected (Higher density, clustering and path lengths) and
hence more complex (ND = 0.097; CPL = 0.248 and CC = 0.845) than the Browns Ferry CSN
(ND = 0.024; CPL = 0.091; CC = 0.834). Appendix G includes the network statistics for all the
incidents contained in HERA.
Another benefit of using CXViz is the ability to work with an aggregate network. The
methodology discussed in this section was used to create 22 different CSNs. A synthesized
network (i.e., the aggregate network) is created by adding the information from the 22 CSNs into
a single network (Figure 13). The aggregate network includes all the possible links from the 22
incidents in HERA. The weight for a node in the aggregate network corresponds to aggregate of
weights for that node across the 22 CSNs. Likewise, the weight for each link in the aggregate
network corresponds to the aggregate weight of that link across the 22 CSNs. Using the
aggregate network, the main contributors to control room complexity as well as important
interrelations between them could be identified objectively. The aggregate CSN is explained in
more detail in Section 5. A future functionality to be added is allowing the user to determine
which networks to aggregate, since a subset of all the networks may be of interest.
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Figure 13. The aggregate CSN for incidents in HERA
This section has presented how objective complexity, defined using the NRC-approved incident
databases, can be quantified. As discussed in Chapter 2, one of the limitations of this approach is
the influence of the subjective views of the NRC employees involved in preparation of such
incident reports. This makes the data from incident reports quasi-objective. However, although
there is some subjectivity involved in how these reports are created, the data from incident report
databases are arguably a plausible resource to reflect objective reality, or what Babbie (2010)
calls the "Agreement Reality", since such reports are subject to significant review and regulatory
agency endorsement. On the other hand, subjective complexity is equally important to
understand, so that it can be compared against objective complexity and within stakeholder
groups. In order to investigate possible stakeholder disparities, subjective complexity data needs
to be gathered from different stakeholder groups, and is discussed in the next section.
4.4 Step 4: Subjective Validation
In order to gather subjective complexity views of the stakeholders, a digital survey was
developed that allows different groups to rate the identified source, rank the most important
sources in terms of their contribution to complexity, and to identify potential interactions
between them. Since the survey interview was used as the main method to gather subjective data,
the iPad platform was used for its portability and interactivity. The Objective C programming
language was used to develop a tool called CXSurvey. Using this tool, stakeholders' opinion on
the identified sources of complexity could be gathered. The results of individual surveys are
saved in a database and are transformed into CXViz format for further analysis.
4.4.1 Sampling
Due to access limitations, low population (for designers and reviewers), and government
regulations such as the Paperwork Reduction Act3 , non-probability sampling methods were used.
First, NRC provided a convenience sample for operators and NRC reviewers. Next, snowball
sampling was used to identify control room designers. Several companies such as GE,
Westinghouse, Mitsubishi, Toshiba, A&W and Areva were contacted and referrals were made.
Overall, 8 designers, 3 reviewers and 16 operators were interviewed.
4.4.2 Procedure
Using CXSurvey, the interviewees were first asked to review a consent form (Appendix H), and
then they were asked to provide their demographic information. Next, the interviewees reviewed,
3 http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/laws/paperwork-reduction/
rated (section 4.4.2.1) and ranked (section 4.4.2.2) the identified sources and updated the list if
necessary. Next, a unique CSN appeared based on the ratings provided, and the interviewees
were asked to identify important interactions (links) between such sources that they perceived as
contributing to accidents or job difficulties (section 4.4.2.3). The resultant CSN then feeds into
CXViz for further analysis. Lastly, each interviewee answered a series of open-ended questions
regarding sources of complexity and potential complexity mitigations (section 4.4.2.4). A post-
survey interview was conducted to understand the rationale behind specific choices made during
the survey.
4.4.2.1 Complexity Source Rating
In this part, interviewees were asked to rate all the previously identified sources of complexity on
a 5-point Likert scale (1 - "Strongly Disagree, 2 - "Disagree, 3 - "Neither Agree nor Disagree, 4 -
"Agree", and 5 - "Strongly Agree"). An "N/A" option was provided to let the interviewee
identify the sources that are not relevant to complexity of NPP control room environments
(Figure 14) Additional definitions and examples were provided for each source to clarify their
meaning in the NPP control room context. The wording of sources was slightly modified to
facilitate their comprehension. In addition, several sources that were not supported by HERA
incident were removed. A pilot study was conducted using two NRC ex-operators and one NRC
reviewer, the result of which informed the wording of sources (see Appendix B.3 for the list of
sources). In order to improve the comprehensibility of this part and to manage the level of
cognitive effort required to compare different sources, six different categories of sources were
used (see Table 3 for a list of these categories and their definitions). To facilitate grouping and to
improve the recognition of different categories, each category was developed on a different page
with a unique background color.
Figure 14. Complexity source rating for the physical environment
Table 3. Complexity source categories
Complexity Category Definition
Physical Environment The relatively stable aspects of the environment in which operators work
Task Factors Factors dictated by the state of the plant
Procedural Factors Procedural factors used to retain/return the plant to the desired state.
Organizational Factors Factors determined by organizational rules, regulations and processes.
The components of the control room with which operators must interact in
Human System Interface (HSI) order to control, monitor, and interact with the system.
Cognitive Factors Those cognitive factors unique to individual operators
4.4.2.2 Complexity Source Ranking
In this part, the interviewees ranked the sources of complexity that they thought contributed the
most to complexity of the NPP control rooms. This part has two pages. On the first page, the
interviewee chooses the top 5 sources in terms of contribution to complexity of the NPP control
rooms from the list of sources that were rated 4 or 5 in part 2. On the second page, the
interviewee is asked to rank the top 5 sources they choose on the first page (Figure 15).
Figure 15. Complexity source ranking. Choosing top 5 (left) and Ranking the top 5 (right)
4.4.2.3 Identifying Interactions
In this part, interviewees were asked to identify the interactions between the identified sources of
complexity. First, an explanation was provided to prepare each interviewee for this section (see
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Appendix I). Next, based on their source ratings, the interviewees viewed a complexity source
network emerging in a circular format (Figure 16). Interviewees then interacted with the
interface to rotate the network and were asked to identify pairwise links between nodes in terms
of their combination of effects in an incident. After a link was created, the interviewee was asked
to choose a weight on a 5-point scale for the link in terms of importance of contribution.
Interviewees are asked to identify 5 or more links.
Figure 16. An example CSN for choosing complexity source interactions
4.4.2.4 The Open-ended Questions
In the last part of the survey, the interviewees responded to a series of open-ended questions (see
Appendix I). First the interviewees were asked to identify other potential sources of complexity.
Next, they were asked to suggest potential complexity mitigations techniques. Lastly, they were
asked to provide any additional feedback or comments.
4.5 Step 5: Objective-Subjective and Stakeholder Views Variations
The ranking information, described in Section 4.4.2.2, was then compared to the top 5 objective
sources with the highest number of evidences (i.e., most common sources) to ensure that
complexity views of the stakeholders are aligned with the objective reality of the incidents
included in HERA. In addition, the source rating information, discussed in Section 4.4.2.1 was
used to compare different stakeholder groups in terms of their views on specific sources of
complexity.
In conclusion, this chapter introduced the first 4 steps of a 5-step methodology to address the
research questions raised in Chapter 3. Step 1: a list of sources of complexity was produced
using a combination of methods. Step 2: content analysis was used to find objectively evidence
for the identified sources in 22 previous incidents included in the HERA database. An evidence
database was created and was used as the basis for the objective validation of sources Step 3:
potential interactions between the identified sources were identified and represented via the
complexity source networks. Step 4: subjective views of the operators, designers, and NRC
reviewers on the identified sources were collected using the survey-interview method. Step 5
(discussed in the next Chapter): the objective evidence from the HERA database was compared
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to the subjective views of the stakeholders to identify potential variations. In addition, the
subjective views of different stakeholder groups (e.g., Designers, Operator, and Reviewers) were
compared to identify potential differences in their views on the identified sources. The next
chapter discusses the result of these comparisons.
5. RESULTS
In order to address the research questions described in Chapter 3, an analysis was conducted on
the evidence obtained using the content analysis of the HERA database and the subjective
complexity views gathered using the survey-interview. This chapter highlights the results of this
analysis.
5.1 Most Contributing Sources of Perceived Complexity
Using the evidence-based approach discussed in Chapter 4, the main contributors to perceived
complexity in 22 incidents in HERA were identified. In particular, two different rankings were
developed: the mostfrequent sources and the most connected sources.
5.1.1 Most Frequent Sources
The most frequent sources are the sources for which the most number of evidences were found in
the HERA evidence database. As discussed in Chapter 4, whenever a source was found to be a
contributor to a single sub-event in a particular incident in HERA, the sub-event code associated
with that sub-event was collected as the evidence to support the existence of the source. The
ranking of the most recurring sources was created with regards to the number of evidences in the
HERA evidence database (Table 4). In other words, sources with large number of evidences
were identified as contributor to the perceived complexity of the operator(s) in different sub-
event more frequently.
Table 4. Ranking of the most supported sources
Ranking Source Euiees
1 Stress 591
2 Inadequate procedures 180
3 Available time 94
4 Number of external interruptions 87
5 Number of inoperable modules 83
6 Inadequate communication 65
7 Number of parallel procedures 53
8 Number of crew members 47
9 Number of years of experience in same control 45room
10 Information amount 40
11 Number of procedures, Number of team hierarchy 38levels
12 Number of simulator hours completed per operator 37
13 Number of malfunctioning modules 36
14 Incorrect simulations, Number of alarms 20
15 Number of steps in procedures 19
16 Fatigue, Number of information sources per 17inference
17 Control rooma layout 15
18 Number of required inferences per procedure 13
Conflicting procedures, Number of years of
19 working with the same crew (team familiarity), 11
Variety of procedures
20 Number of control devices, Number of crew 9members required for each procedure
21 Distance between displays, Variety of alarms 8
22 Number of collaborative procedures, Number of 7procedure switches
23 Number of displays 5
24 Ambient noise level, Clutter, Number of redundant 4control devices
25 Control room size, Number of inferences per step 3
Duration between steps, Frequency of operational
mode transitions, Number of critical events in the
26 last shift, Number of dependent procedures, 2
Number of operational mode transitions, Number
of shared control devices
27 Display size, Distance between control devices, 1Distance between control devices and displays
According to these results, stress was identified as the main contributor to the perceived
complexity in 591 sub-events, which accounts for 35% of the total number of evidences (1674).
This high node-weight contribution explains the large size of the node corresponding to stress in
the aggregate CSN (Figure 17). Inadequate procedures were the second largely supported source
for being the contributor in 180 sub-events, which accounts for almost 11% of the total number
of evidences. Available time, number of external interruptions and number of inoperable
modules were also well supported with 94, 87 and 84 evidences accordingly. Appendix L
includes the node-weight contributions for sources. In addition, no evidence was found for 28
sources listed in Table 5. The majority of such sources are related to digital interface or display
components of the control room (e.g., font size, number of icons, etc.) and were identified by the
subject matter experts with the advanced digital control rooms in mind. Unfortunately, since
most of the incidents analyzed in HERA have occurred in the 1970s and 1980s, such digital
components were absent from the control rooms under investigation.
SMKO$fes per step(of ormation sources per step
r aon between stegStep duration
ftdf"WW9WM ltrs required for each procedure
by els
qre u nit conversions
tk aIj u r of Visualizations
Clutter *Text to graphics ratio
Dis ation *Refresh rate
aet of icons
n size ,Real-time update rate
Number of years of experience in different control rc
eff4e~fld~iahaP ffeirfi hWm (team ft
Number of simulator hours completed per operator
Stress
Figure 17. Stress in the aggregate CSN
Table 5. Sources for which no evidence was found in HERA
Environmental Complexity
e Operational mode duration
Organizational Complexity
e Duration between procedures
- Duration of procedures
e Number of information
sources per step
e Duration of steps
* Number of required unit
conversions
* Variety of required unit
conversions
e Shift length
Coinitive Comolexitv
* Boredom
- Number of years of
experience in different
control rooms
Interface ComDlexitv
* Alarm duration
* Display luminance
" Display resolution
* Distance between controls
and their associated
displays
- Font size
* Icon size
* Number of animated
display features
- Number of redundant
displays
- Number of shared displays
- Number of visualizations
e Real-time update rate
- Refresh rate
e Text to graphics ratio
e Variety of colors
* Variety of control devices
* Variety of displays
- Variety of fonts
- Variety of icons
5.1.2 Most Connected Sources
As discussed in section 4.3, when presenting an incident using a complexity source network,
interactive complexity of the incident could be shown as links between the sources (nodes). In
that sense, the number of links to a source (node degree) can be considered an important
indicator of importance. Table 6 lists the ranking of sources by degree or number of connections.
According to these results, stress is the most connected source in the aggregate CSN with 41
links followed by information amount, inadequate procedures and available time with 36, 35, and
34 links accordingly. Although the number of connections in the degree ranking is close in
compare to the number of evidences in the weight ranking, generally the majority of the rankings
agree in both lists. Intuitively, the more supported (by evidence) sources are also the most
connected. These so called orphan nodes are essentially the same sources for which no evidence
was found in HERA. Since the majority of these sources are sources related to interfaces or
displays, the lack of evidence in the incidents included in HERA that occurred in the 1970s and
1980s is not surprising.
5.2 Objective Evidence vs. Subjective Complexity Views
Using the data provided by the HERA content analysis (objective evidence) and survey-
interview of the stakeholders (subjective views) discussed in Chapter 4, the objective-subjective
comparison (research question 2) can be accomplished. One of the main limitations of this study
is access to stakeholders. Overall, a convenient sample of 8 designers, 16 operators and 3
reviewers identified 20, 7, and 10 distinct sources in their top 5 rankings. Also as shown in Table
4 and Appendix L, the top 5 sources in the node-weight ranking account for almost 64% of total
number of evidences found in HERA. Therefore, the non-identification of these sources by
stakeholder groups may support the hypothesis that there are large variations between
complexity views of the stakeholders and the objective reality of previous incidents in HERA.
Table 6. Ranking of the most connected sources
Ranking Source Connect ons
1 Stress 41
2 Information amount 36
3 Inadequate procedures 35
4 Available time 34
5 Number of available crew 33
6 Number of parallel procedures 32
Inadequate communications, Number of team
7 hierarchy levels, Number of 31
inoperable/malfunctioning modules
8 Number of control devices 30
9 Number of displays 29
10 Number of external interruptions. Distance 27between displays
11 Number of procedures, Number of crew members 25required for each procedure
12 Number of steps in a procedure, Number of 24information sources per inference
13 Number of years of experience in the same control 23room
14 Number of alarms 22
15 Number of steps in procedures 21
16 Variety of procedures, Number of required 19inferences per procedure
17 Variety of alarms 18
18 Clutter, Team familiarity 17
19 Number of procedure switches, Number of 16
simulator hours cornpleted
20 Distance between control devices and displays 14
21 Duration between steps, Distance between control 13devices
22 Number of dependent procedure, Incorrect 11simulation
23 Number of redundant control devices, Cognitive 10fatigue
Number of operational mode transitions,
24 Frequency of operational mode transitions, Control 5
room size
25 Conflicting procedures 4
26 Control room layout, Number of critical events 3during the past shift
27 Number of inferences per step, Number of shared 2control devices
28 Display size, Variety of control devices 1
For the purposes of this preliminary investigation, the top 5 most supported sources were
compared to the top 5 selection of each stakeholder group (see Appendix K for a complete
comparison of all the sources identified in the top 5 selection of stakeholders and the objective
sources). A weighting system was used to create the aggregate top 5 for each stakeholder group.
First the following weights were assigned to the ranking list of each interviewee: 5 for the first
rank, 4 for the second rank, 3 for the third rank, 2 for the fourth rank and 1 for the fifth rank.
Next, all the entries from the interviewees within a stakeholder group was listed and the weights
for common sources were added together. In case of a tie, the number of appearance in different
rankings was used. Finally, the top 5 sources with highest weights were selected. Table 7 lists the
top 5 selections for different stakeholder groups in compare to the objective top 5 sources from
Table 6. Appendix K lists the full list of sources included in the top 5 selections of different
stakeholder groups.
According to these results, out of the three groups, reviewers were more in line with the
objective representation of HERA. Reviewers identified 4 of the top 5 objectively supported
sources. This result is not surprising since NRC employees were more familiar with the past
incidents and were potentially familiar with HERA. On the other hand, Operators identified only
two of the top 5 sources. Designers did not find any of the objective top 5 sources. This result
might indicate that designers' views on complexity are somewhat unrealistic in compare to the
objective representation of HERA or at least doesn't acknowledge some of the recurring
complexity sources that contributed to the previous incidents under investigation. Since the top 5
objective sources were heavily supported by the evidence, and hence, contributed many times to
past incidents, non-acknowledgement of the importance of such sources might indicate a gap in
systematic learning from previous accidents. Although this result is important, the significance of
the chosen sources by each group should be also assessed.
Table 7. Top 5 selections of stakeholder groups vs. the objective top 5. The sources in agreement
with the objecrtive to S ar shown in reen
Objective Designers Reviewers Operators
1. Too Many Information 1. Amount of
1. Stress Sources to Make and 1. Time Constraints Malfunctioning
Assessment Equipment
2. Inadequate 2. Number of 2. Inaccurate Simulator 2. Volume of Information
Procedures Concurrently Used Train*ng 2 oueo nomtoProcedures
3. Number of
Inoperable 3. Level of Assessment 3. Too Many Alarms 3. Too Many Alarms
Modules/Malfunction Effort
ing Modules
4. Time Constraints 4. Too Many Procedures 4. Too Many External 4. Too Many ExternalInterruptions Interruption
5. Number of External 5. Time Constraints 5. Stress 5. Inadequate
Interruptions Communication
In order to evaluate the importance of identified sources in each group in compare to the
available evidence, the node-weight contribution of stakeholder group selections were calculated.
First, the percentage of contribution of each source was calculated as the weight of the source
(the number of evidences found to support it) divided by the sum of all the source weights. For
example the percentage of contribution of "Number of Malfunctioning Modules" was calculated
as 36 (weight of the source or the number of evidences found for the source)/1674 (sum of all the
evidences) = 2.15% (see Appendix J for node-weight contribution of all the sources). According
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to this calculation, the top 5 objective sources account for 64% of the overall evidence derived
from the incident report databases. Next, the percentage of contribution for stakeholders' top 5
sources was calculated and the overall contribution was compared with the objective top 5
sources (Figure 18).
Comparison of Node-Weight Contributions
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Figure 18. A comparison of different stakeholder groups' top 5 selections and the objective top 5
in terms of percentage of node-weight contribution
The results show a high agreement between reviewers' views on complexity and the objective
complexity data. The top 5 sources ranked by the Reviewers reflect 57.77% of the overall
evidence derived from the incident report databases. Designers not only did not acknowledge any
of the objective top 5 sources, but also their identified source weights reflect only 8.91% of the
objective evidence. Finally, although operators acknowledged two of the objective top 5 sources,
the top 5 sources they thought contributed the most to perceived complexity account for only
15% of the total number of evidences.
The same weighting system (5-4-3-2-1) was used on the top 5 sources derived in the previous
step for each stakeholder group to get the overall subjective top 5. Figure 19 shows the
comparison between the top 5 subjective and the top 5 objective sources.
COMPLEXITY
OBJECTIVE or DESCRIPTIVE SUBJECTIVE or PERCEIVED
TOP Sources Top 5 Sources
1. Stress 1. Too Many Alarms
2. Inadequate Procedures 2. Inadequate Procedures
3. Number of Indperable/ 3. Time Constraints
Malfuncioni Modules * * 4. Volume of Information
4. NumberofExtera S. Number of External
[iter Interruptions
5. Time Cons tints
Figure 19. Comparison between objective and subjective top 5 sources
According to these results, overall the aggregated stakeholder views on complexity agree with
the majority of the objective evidence from the 22 incidents analyzed in the HERA database.
Aggregate stakeholders' top 5 sources include 3 of the objective top 5 sources. However, the top
5 subjective sources only account for 25.15% of overall number of evidences found in HERA,
whereas, the top 5 objective sources reflect 63.98% of the evidences. In addition, the current
approach doesn't take the difference between the stakeholder groups into account and assumes
an agreement among operators, designers and reviewers. This assumption will be checked in
section 5.4.
5.3 The Effects of Removing Stress
The content analysis of HERA revealed that Stress contributed the most to subjective complexity
of NPP control rooms in the 22 incidents under investigation. 591 evidences were found for
stress, which stands for 35.30% of total number of evidences (1674). However, Stress is also a
controversial choice as a source of complexity. Although stress could be considered a source of
complexity, it could also be the effect of complexity in a causal manner. For that reason,
performing the analysis without stress could be insightful.
Stress was replaced by the next highest ranked source "Inadequate Communication" in the
objective top 5 as the 5th most supported source. Table 8 shows the updated node-weight
contribution of the objective top 5 sources (without stress) and subjective stakeholder top 5
selections. Using the same weighting system discussed in the previous section, the updated
percentages of contribution without stress were calculated and the different groups were
compared as shown in Figure 20. Without stress, reviewers' agreement with the objective top 5
was reduced from 4 sources to 3 and the operators' agreement was improved from 2 sources to 3.
Designers are still the group with the most mismatched complexity views. They did not identify
any of the objective top 5 sources. In terms of node-weight contribution of the sources chosen by
different groups, designers were the worst group with 13.85% agreement with the objective data.
Reviewers and Researchers' top 5 sources more closely matched the objective top 5 with 36%
and 23% contribution respectively. According to this result, although the percentage of node-
weight contribution is slightly improved for operators and designers, there are still large
variations between these views and the objective evidence.
Table 8. Top 5 selections of different stakeholder groups without stress
Objective Designers Reviewers Operators
1. Too Many 1. Amount of1. Inadequate Information Sources 1. Time Constraints Malfunctioning
Procedures to Make and EquipmentAssessment
2. Number of 2. Number ofInoperable Concurrently Used 2. Inaccurate Simulator 2. Volume of
Modules/Malfunctio Procedures Training Information
ning Modules
3. Time Constraints 3. Level of Assessment 3. Too Many Alarms 3. Too Many AlarmsTimeContrantsEffort
4. Number of External 4. Too Many Procedures 4. Too Many External 4. Too Many External
Interruptions Interruptions Interruption
5. Inadequate 5. Time Constraints 5. Cognitive Fatigue 5. Inadequate
Communication Communication
Comparison of Node-Weight Contributions w/o
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Figure 20. Percentage of agreement of the stakeholders' top 5 selections with the objective top 5
5.4 Stakeholder Complexity Views
5.4.1 Descriptive analysis of source ratings
As discussed in Chapter 5, each stakeholder was asked to rate the identified sources on a 5-point
Likert scale. The responses were coded by assigning a numerical value to each. In the survey,
respondents were asked how much they agree or disagree with the contribution of 54 sources to
perceived complexity in NPP operations. The response categories were strongly agree, agree,
neither agree or disagree, disagree, strongly disagree, and not applicable. The responses were
coded as follows: not applicable = 0, strongly disagree = 1, disagree = 2, undecided = 3, agree
4, and strongly agree = 5. These data were entered on an Excel spreadsheet for analysis.
First, a descriptive analysis of the rating data was conducted in which the most frequent rating
(mode) for each source was identified (see Appendix M). This result showed that the majority of
stakeholders agreed with the majority of sources (i.e., on average, the stakeholders chose the
rating of 4 for 75% of the sources). In addition, "Cognitive fatigue" and "Conflicting
procedures" were rated 5 (strongly agree) by the majority of the stakeholders. Table 9 lists the
sources for which the majority of the stakeholders gave the rating of 0-3.
Finally, to simplify the results, a general agreement/disagreement analysis as suggested by
Trochim (2000) and others was conducted for different categories of factors listed in Table 3.
First, the two response categories, "strongly agree (5)" and "agree (4)" were combined into a
single nominal category called "agree". Likewise, the two response categories "strongly
disagree (1), and "disagree (2) were combined into the nominal category "disagree". Figures 21-
27 depict the range of responses visually with bar charts that display the number of respondents
79
who expressed agreement, disagreement, or undecided, with physical environment factors, task
factors, procedural factors, organizational factors, human system interface factors, and cognitive
factors respectively.
Table 9. Sources that were rated 0-3
Rating Source
Not Applicable (0) e Too few control devices shared by different system
Strongly Disagree (1) None
e Too many operational mode transitions
e Frequency of operational mode transitions
e Amount of required unit conversions
e Variety of procedures
* Too few steps in a procedure
Disagree (2) e Too few crew members to execute the procedure
e Too few redundant panels
- Too few control devices
e Too few redundant control devices
e Too many redundant control devices
e Too many information sources to make an assessment
e Control room size
Neither Agree or Disagree (3) * Too many items on turnover sheets
e Panel too small
e Panel too large
Physical Environment
* Disagree
a Agree
Undecided
Control Room Size Control Room Ambient Noise Level Too Many External
Layout Interruptions
Figure 21. Ratings for physical environment factors
Task Factors
0 1 --
Time Constraints Frequency of Too Many Crew
Operational Mode Members Available
Transitions
a Disagree
U Agree
Undecided
Amount of Required
Unit Conversions
Figure 22. Ratings for task factors
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Figure 27. Ratings for cognitive factors
5.4.2 Stakeholder complexity view comparison
In order to address research question 3 ("Are there large variations between Designers, Operators
and Reviewers views on complexity?"), the source ratings data collected from each group were
used. The average rating for each source was then calculated for each stakeholder group and the
averages were compared. The results show several interesting differences between the
stakeholder group views on several sources, which support the hypothesis that different
stakeholder groups think differently about complexity. Table 10 presents these differences. In
general, the nature of most of these disagreements is not clear and need further investigation.
-ences between the Reviewerm I
Too many operational mode transitions Agree
Frequency of operational mode transitions Agree Undecided
Too few crew members available Agree
Too many items on turnover sheet Undecided Agree
Amount of required unit conversions Agree Agree
Variety of procedures Agree Undecided
Too many checkpoints Agree
Too many steps in procedure Agree
Too few crew members required to execute the task Undecided Agree
Too few information sources to make an assessment Agree Agree
Too many information sources to make an assessment Agree
Level of assessment effort Agree Udecided
Team unfamiliarity Agree Agree
Shift length Agree Agree
Inadequate simulator training Agree Undecided
Experience in other control rooms Agree Agree
Boredom Agree Agree
Too few HSI panels Agree Agree
Variety of HSI panels Agree Agree
Too few control devices Agree Agree
Too many redundant control devices Agree Agree
Variety of control devices Agree
Table 10. Source e~rq and Onfer
5.4.2.1 Physical environment factors
Participants in the survey were generally in agreement about physical environment sources. As
shown in Figure 28, all the stakeholder groups agreed with contribution of these sources to
perceived complexity (i.e., the average ratings for sources were between three [neither agree of
disagree] and five [strongly agree]). The only exception was "control room size" for which the
Designers neither agreed nor disagreed.
Physical Environment Factors
N Designers 0 Reviewers Operators
Figure 28. Differences in average ratings of different groups on physical environment factors
5.4.2.2 Task factors
As shown in Figure 29, the 3 groups of stakeholders were in disagreement for the majority of
task factors (5 out of 7). An interesting result in this category was the difference in ratings for
"Too few crew members available". Although Designers and Operators disagreed with the
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Control Room Size Control Room Layout Ambient Noise Level Too Many External
Interruptions
contribution of this source to perceived complexity, Operators highly agreed about this. On the
other hand, all the 3 groups agreed on the contribution of "Too many crew members available".
This result might reveal an important gap in operational knowledge of Designers and Reviewers
with regards to team size.
Task Factors
Figure 29. Differences in task factors ratings
5.4.2.3 Procedural factors
As shown in Figure 30, stakeholders were generally in disagreement with the majority of sources
in this category (7 out of 13). In general, Designers agreed with the contribution of the majority
of these sources to perceived complexity (11 out of 13). On the other hand, Reviewers disagreed
with the majority of the procedural factors. This interesting gap between the views of Designers
and Reviewers on procedural factors warrants more investigation.
Procedural Factors
5
4
3
2 CU W J ) W W
2 00 
1 WA.
a.U 0 -6-
P~ .0
U s Designers a Reviewers Operators
Figure 30. Differences in procedural factors ratings
5.4.2.4 Organizational factors
As shown in Figure 31, the stakeholder groups were in disagreement for the majority of
organizational sources (3 out of 5). An important result in this category is the large variation
between the Reviewers' view on training with Designers and Operators view. Although
Reviewers strongly believe that inadequate or inaccurate training is an important issue that could
affect perceived complexity, Designers and Operators disagreed or were undecided about or
disagreed with this contribution. Some possible explanations for this large variation might be
overconfidence in training.
Organizational Factors
Team Shift Length Inadequate Inaccurate Inadequate
-Mw
Unfamiliarity Simulator Simulator Communication
Training Training
* Designers U Reviewers Operators
Figure 31. Differences in organizational factors ratings
5.4.2.5 Cognitive factors
Overall, the Designers, Reviewers and Operators were in agreement about the majority of
cognitive sources (3 out of 5). As shown in Figure 32, the main source of disagreement between
the stakeholders is "boredom". Although Reviewers disagreed with the contribution of boredom
to perceived complexity, Operators strongly believed that boredom is an important factor
contributing to their perceived complexity. On the other hand, the 3 groups agreed on the role of
"cognitive fatigue" in perceived complexity. Since boredom and fatigue are two ends of the
spectrum when it comes to workload, stakeholders' agreement on the effects of high workload
on perceived complexity and their disagreement on the effects of low workload warrants further
investigation.
U'
Cognitive Factors
5
4
3
2
1
0
Years Experience Experience in Boredom Cognitive Fatigue Stress
in Same Control Other Control
Room Rooms
8 Designers 8 Reviewers Operators
Figure 32. Differences in cognitive factors ratings
5.4.2.6 Human system interface factors
The result of the survey shows a high degree of agreement between the stakeholder groups on the
majority of human system interface factors (17 out of 22). Reviewers were the group who
disagreed the most with the sources in this category (10 out of 22 sources).
In conclusion, a list of important complexity sources was presented that could be used as the
initial step in future complexity mitigation approaches. Overall, the results discussed in this
chapter provide some evidence for a large variation between the complexity view of Designers
and the objective evidence gathered from the incident report databases (i.e., a large A in Figure
2). In addition, as hypothesized in Chapter 3, these results show gaps between the mental models
of Designers, Operators and Reviewers with regards to sources that contribute to perceived
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complexity (i.e., 6s in Figure 2). In particular, the stakeholders were in agreement on the
majority of sources related to physical environment, human system interface, and cognitive
complexity with the exception of "boredom". Although Operators admitted that boredom had a
strong contribution to their perceived complexity, and hence the overall performance, Reviewers
and Designers were reluctant to admit or were unaware of the importance of the implications of
boredom in the NPP operations. This finding points to an important organizational problem that
warrants further investigation. Moreover, extreme disagreement in views about organizational
factors, task factors and procedural factors needs further examination.
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6. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this research, a methodology to study perceived complexity in NPP control rooms is proposed.
The method investigates the sources that make a control room complex to the eyes of the human
operators using a systems approach. Next generation NPP control rooms may challenge human
cognitive limitations by presenting information in complex ways. In order to mitigate important
complexity sources that contribute to human performance, it is vital not only to identify such
sources, but also the disparities between the objective evidence and the subjective complexity
views of the stakeholders to ensure that complexity considerations in the NPP control room
designs and approval of such designs are realistic (considering the available evidence).
Systematic analyses of previous incidents, an extensive literature review and operator interviews
led to the generation of some of the potential sources of complexity that may contribute to
human performance. Network representation (complexity source network) was used to identify
the interconnections between such sources. Measuring complexity in a network was proposed as
analogous to measuring the number of nodes/links and their interconnections. Therefore,
mitigating complexity of such networks could be achieved by reducing its connectivity. In order
to facilitate this investigation and analysis, a network information visualization and analysis
called CXViz was implemented. CXViz not only enables a visual analysis of the most important
contributors in complexity networks, but also provides several important connectivity measures
of such networks.
In order to investigate the hypothesis that network representations can effectively represent NPP
system complexity and provide a roadmap for complexity mitigation, networks need to be
constructed from both objective and subjective complexity data for further analysis. It is
important to understand how subjective stakeholder views of complexity differ from an objective
complexity perspective in order to understand gaps in the mental models between operators,
designers, and regulatory entities. It was proposed that objective complexity can be measured for
NPP systems via NRC-approved databases, however such measurements are actually only quasi-
objective since the databases also represent human consensus.
An evidence-based approach was used to identify objective evidence to support the identified
sources. 22 previous incidents included in the HERA database were parsed and an evidence
database was created. Using the available evidence the ranking of the most common or most
supported sources (across the 22 incidents) and the most connected sources in the aggregate CSN
was reported. The results showed a strong homogeneity between the two rankings. In addition, it
was found that the top 5 sources in the most supported ranking account for the majority of the
available evidence. "Stress", "Available Time", and "Inadequate Procedures" were the three
sources that were included in the top 5 for both rankings. This result provides the first and
necessary step in targeting specific sources for mitigation design within the nuclear power plant
control room.
In order to facilitate the subjective data collection and analysis, a dynamic survey called
CXSurvey was developed. Three groups of stakeholders, Designers, Reviewers and Operators
were chosen and a survey-interview method was used to collect subjective complexity data from
representatives of each group. Interviewees were asked to rate the identified sources in terms of
contribution to perceived complexity, rank the top 5, and to identify some of the links between
the sources in a customized CSN (based on their ratings and ranking of sources). The top 5
rankings from each stakeholder group were compared to the objective top 5 sources (from the
most supported ranking) to identify potential gaps between the mental models of different groups
and the objective reality of the previous incidents under investigation.
The results showed large variations between the complexity view of Designers and Operators
with the objective complexity evidence. Designers in particular did not acknowledge any of the
top 5 most supported (objective) sources. On the other hand, Reviewers were more in line with
the objective evidence from the previous incidents. These results show: 1) There's a significant
disparity between what designers and operators think the sources of complexity are and the
objective reality of the past incidents investigated in this research. Due to low probability of
incidents in the NPP domain, any evidence for recurrent problems should be investigated
thoroughly and be considered in the new designs. Therefore, the fact that designers did not
acknowledge many of these recurrent problematic sources could indicate a problem. 2)
According to the results, the need for the addition of complexity considerations in the human
factors design review guidelines is warranted. 3) Since the reviewers' views on complexity were
close to the objective evidence obtained in this research, a more effective communication
mechanism between the NRC and control room designers or operators might help aligning their
views on complexity. Finally, 4) these results might indicate the lack of a systematic incident
analysis mechanism to learn collectively from the past incidents. In particular, these results show
that such systematic learning may not be reflected in the operator training modules.
Finally, the analysis of source ratings showed large variations between the way Designers,
Reviewers and Operators think about sources of complexity. Overall, the 3 groups were in
disagreement on a majority of task factors, procedural factors and organizational factors. In
addition, although the 3 groups were in agreement on the majority of cognitive factors, their
views on the role of boredom as a source of perceived complexity differs significantly. Although
Operators admit the importance of boredom in their perceived complexity, NRC Reviewers
disagreed with the contribution of boredom to perceived complexity. This result warrants further
investigation since previous research provides evidence for the negative effects of boredom on
operator performance in human supervisory control domains (Kass, Vodanovich, Stanny, &
Taylor, 2001; Thackray, Powell, Bailey, & Touchstone, 1975). These findings warrant further
investigation of these important intra-organizational problems.
6.1 Future Work
In this section, several important directions for future work are discussed. First, the rankings of
important sources discussed in Chapter 6 could be utilized to mitigate the effects of perceived
complexity on operator performance and overall plant safety. The identified sources could be
prioritized in terms of likelihood of mitigation or difficulty of mitigation due to technical or other
factors. Nodes could be removed from the complexity source networks and the effects of
removing nodes on the overall complexity of the network could be analyzed. In addition
controlled experiment could be used to investigate the effects of mitigating a source (nodes) or
an interaction (links).
Due to several limitations in accessing data, both in terms of number of incidents reported and
the access to stakeholders, iterations are an important aspect of the proposed methodology. New
incidents could be added to the HERA database or analyzed from similar incident report
databases to improve the validity of the results, refine the list of sources and improve the
evidence database. Additional coders could repeat content analysis of the HERA to improve the
inter-coder reliability and to refine the available evidence. Furthermore, to improve the validity
of the result, additional interviewees from each stakeholder group should be identified and
interviewed.
Complexity source networks could be analyzed further to provide more insight about the
incidents. First, the emergence of a CSN over time could be analyzed to shed some light on the
nature of interactive complexity between the sources. Next, CSNs for different incidents could
be compared to identify common patterns of interactions between the nodes and different
complexity levels.
Lastly, important gaps between the subjective complexity view of the stakeholders and the
objective complexity evidence should be further investigated. Further data collection including
structured stakeholder interview or focus groups is needed to understand the causes of such gaps
and to provide insight into potential mitigating actions. In addition, important gaps between the
complexity views of the stakeholder groups should be further investigated. Additional data
collection may help identifying the reasons for such differences and potential alignment policies
could be developed accordingly.
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Appendix A: Complexity Questionnaire
Questionnaire for Managing Complexity in Nuclear Power Plant Control Rooms
Thanks for participating in this interview. Your input is extremely valuable and will be
considered in the design of new generation control rooms.
Instructions: This questionnaire asks you to answer to a series of questions regarding the
Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) control room you have worked in. Part I asks for some demographic
information about your job. For Part II questions, please read the questions (in bold) carefully,
then while thinking about the question, circle the number that best fits your opinion for each
numbered argument. If you have any comments about the general question, please provide them
in the space available. For Part III, please answer on the provided sheet. Please answer each
question to the best of your ability.
*Please remember that the information you provide is confidential and is only being used for
educational purposes. You don't need to provide any identifiable information about yourself.
**For the purposes of this questionnaire we define "display" as all the digital displays including
computer monitors.
Part I
What is the name of the NPP you are operating in (or most recently operated in)?
What is the type of NPP you are operating in (or most recently operated in)? (e.g. Research,
Commercial, Military)
How long have you been licensed?
How many years have you worked in this particular control room?
How many years have you worked as an NPP operator in total?
If you are no longer working as an operator, how long has it been since you were an ac- tive
operator?
How many control rooms have you been worked in? If more than one, please list the names and
types of NPPs.
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Part II
Please circle the number corresponding to your agreement to the particular statement.
1. Does the variety of display features assist you in
acquiring information?
1.1. The following visual features assist me in acquiring
the information in the control room:
1.1.1. Variety of colors in the displays assists me in
acquiring information.
1.1.2. Variety of shapes in the displays assists me in
acquiring information.
1.1.3. Variety of font sizes in the displays assists me
in acquiring information.
1.1.4. Variety of icons in the displays assists me in
acquiring information.
1.1.5. Variety of graphics in the displays assists me in
acquiring information.
1.2. The following auditory features assists me in
assessing the situation in the control room:
1.2.1. Variety of audio alarms assist me in assessing
the situation.
1.2.2. The audio alarms can be distracting.
1.3. The displays use too many different:
1.3.1. Colors
1.3.2. Fonts
1.3.3. Shapes
1.3.4. Icons
1.3.5. Auditory alarms
1.3.6. Windows
1.4. I obtain information better if I ignore some details
like:
1.4.1. Colors
1.4.2. Fonts
1.4.3. Text formats
1.4.4. Graphics
1.4.5. Alarms
Strongly Agree Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly Disagree
5 4 3 2
5 4 3 2
5 4 3 2
5 4 3 2
5 4 3 2
5 4 3 2
5 4 3 2
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Note:
2. How does the variety of control devices (e.g. buttons,
knobs, etc.) assist you in control operations?
2.1. The variety of control device sizes assists me in
control operations.
2.2. The variety of control device colors assists me in
control operations.
2.3. The variety of control device shapes assists me in
control operations.
2.4. The variety of control device text/descriptions
assists me in control operations.
2.5. The physical layout of the control devices assists me
in locating them.
2.6. The physical layout of the control devices assists me
in using them.
2.7. The control devices use too many different:
2.7.1. hardware controls like dials/levers/buttons
2.7.2. soft, programmed buttons
2.7.3. sizes
2.7.4. colors
2.7.5. fonts
2.7.6. shapes
2.7.7. icons
2.8. I can see the controls better if I ignore some of the
details such as:
2.8.1. Colors
2.8.2. Layout
Strongly Agree Agree
5 4
5 4
5 4
5 4
5 4
5 4
Undecided Disagree Strongly Disagree
3 2 1
3 2 1
3 2 1
3 2 1
3 2 1
3 2 1
3 2 1
3 2 1
3 2 1
3 2 1
3 2 1
3 2 1
3 2 1
3 2 1
3 2 1
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2.8.3. Text format 5 4 
3 2
Note:
3. How would you evaluate the overall complexity of the Strongly Agree Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly Disagree
control room?
3.1. The control room is too busy from a visual 5 4 3 2 1
perspective.
3.2. Displays are easily distinguishable at first glance. 5 4 3 2 1
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5 4 3 2. t f r t
3.3. Control devices are easily distinguishable at first
glance.
3.4. The displays are readable from my control station.
3.5. I have to stare at the displays for a while to read the
information.
3.6. Adequate space between different displays exists.
3.7. Adequate space between different control devices
exists.
3.8. 1 have difficulty remembering what different alarms
mean.
3.9. 1 can effectively acquire information.
3.10. The control room layout is simple and easy to work
in.
3.11. It is sometimes difficult to find all the information I
need.
3.12. I do not like the control room layout because it is too
complex.
3.13. 1 can effortlessly understand the information
presented in the control room.
3.14. Working in this control room takes a significant
amount of mental effort.
3.15.1 feel overwhelmed by the amount of information
presented.
3.16. More displays are needed in the control room.
Note:
4. How would you evaluate the overall complexity of the
displayed information in the control room?
4.1. I can easily identify an alarm in a timely manner.
4.2. I have difficulty recognizing the situation when an
alarm sounds.
Note:
5 4 3 2
5 4 3 2
5 4 3 2
5 4 3 2
5 4 3 2
5 4 3 2
5 4 3 2
5 4 3 2
Strongly Agree Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly Disagree
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5. Some of the information presented in the control room
is frequently updated. How do information changes on
the displays affect the way you process information?
5.1. Most information changes are predictable.
5.2. Most information changes are easy to track.
5.3. Keeping track of information changes distracts me
from performing my primary tasks (makes me too
busy).
5.4. The displayed information should change less
frequently.
Note:
Strongly Agree Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly Disagree
5 4 3 2
5 4 3 2
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6. How do the physical interactions within the control
room affect you?
6.1. The interaction with the control devices requires too
many actions to perform tasks.
6.2. The amount of interaction required to perform tasks
does not bother me.
6.3. The interactions required to accomplish my tasks can
confuse me.
6.4. I feel overwhelmed by the amount of interaction
required by the system.
6.5. 1 have to manage more than one action sequence to get
a task done.
6.6. 1 can perform most tasks by following a single action
sequence.
6.7. I might forget the actions needed to complete a task
when I am busy.
Note:
7. How does going through procedure steps affect your
performance?
7.1. I have to access too many displays to perform a
specific task.
7.2. 1 can effortlessly follow procedures to acquire
information.
7.3. 1 can effortlessly follow procedures to perform tasks.
7.4. I have trouble performing tasks because there are so
many steps in the procedure.
7.5. I have difficulty keeping track of constant action items
in the procedure.
7.6. 1 use workarounds (post-it notes, etc.) to remember
more than one procedure step at a time.
7.7. The environment around me (e.g. alarms) adds to my
stress level.
Strongly Agree Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly Disagree
5 4 3 2
5 4 3 2
5 4 3 2
5 4 3 2
5 4 3 2
5 4 3 2
5 4 3 2
Strongly Agree Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly Disagree
5 4 3 2
5 4 3 2
5 4 3 2
5 4 3 2
5 4 3 2
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Note:
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Part III
1. How long is your shift? What do you typically do during this time?
2. What percentage of your shift do you consider as low workload? Have you ever felt bored during your shift?
3. What percentage of your job involves monitoring digital displays? How many do you typically monitor? Is this
more or less than what you need?
4. Can you imagine a situation where an operator could feel overloaded by the information available to him/her on
the displays? Please explain.
5. Can you imagine a situation where an operator would want more information available to him/her on the
displays? Please explain.
6. Can you name some of the mistakes that could happen in your work environment (e.g. near miss, major
incident, minor incident, easily forgotten mistake)? What are the causes of these mistakes?
7. In an alarm situation, how would you rate (easy to difficult) transitioning from steady state monitoring to an
emergency procedure? How long does it take to find the necessary information to execute a procedure?
8. How often do you encounter alarms? How long does it take to understand the situation?
9. What is the most important information you look at? Why is it the most important?
10. How complex is your job? What makes it complex or not?
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11. What is the most complex display you look at/interact with? What makes it the most complex?
12. How would you change the following list of major responsibilities of a nuclear power plant operator? (Add,
combine, subtract)
Responsibilities:
- Reactivity control
- Maintain reactor core cooling
- Maintain reactor coolant system integrity
- Maintain containment integrity
- Control of radioactive effluents
- Start-up control
- Steam generation
- Electricity generation
- Shutdown & Refueling control
- Fuel Management
Do you have any other comments or suggestions?
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Appendix B: List of Sources of Complexity
1. Initial List of Sources of Complexity
Environmental Complexity
1. Control room size
2. Control room layout
3. Operational mode duration
4. Frequency of operational mode transitions
5. Number of operational mode transitions
6. Number of critical events in the last shift
7. Number of external interruptions
8. Ambient noise level
Organizational Complexity
1. Number of procedures
2. Variety of procedures
3. Number of dependent procedures
4. Number of parallel procedures
5. Number of collaborative procedure
6. Number of procedure switches
7. Duration between procedures
8. Duration of procedures
9. Number of required inferences per procedure
10. Number of steps in procedures
11. Number of information sources per inference
12. Number of crew members
13. Number of crew members required for each procedure
14. Number of team hierarchy levels
15. Shift length
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Interface Complexity
16. Number of displays
17. Variety of displays
18. Display size
19. Display resolution
20. Display luminance
21. Number of animated display features
22. Number of shared displays
23. Number of redundant displays
24. Distance between displays
25. Number of control devices
26. Variety of control devices
27. Number of shared control devices
28. Number of redundant control devices
29. Distance between control devices
30. Distance between control devices and displays
31. Distance between controls and their associated displays
32. Clutter
33. Information amount
34. Number of alarms
35. Variety of alarms
36. Alarm duration
37. Variety of icons
38. Icon Size
39. Variety of fonts
40. Font size
41. Variety of colors
42. Text to graphics ratio
43. Refresh rate
44. Real-time update rate
45. Number of required unit conversions
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Cognitive Complexity
46. Number of years of experience in different control rooms
47. Number of years of experience in same control room
48. Number of years working with the same crew (team unfamiliarity)
49. Number of simulator hours completed per operator
50. Boredom
51. Cognitive Fatigue
2. Sources of Complexity Used in CXViz (sources that were added after the HERA content
analysis are shown in red)
117
Environmental Complexity
1. Control room size
2. Control room layout
3. Available time
4. Operational mode duration
5. Frequency of operational mode transitions
6. Number of operational mode transitions
7. Number of critical events in the last shift
8. Number of external interruptions
9. Ambient noise level
Organizational Complexity
118
10. Number of procedures
11.Variety of procedures
12. Number of dependent procedures
13. Number of parallel procedures
14. Number of collaborative procedure
15. Conflicting procedures
16. Inadequate procedures
17. Number of procedure switches
18. Duration between procedures
19. Duration of procedures
20. Number of required inferences per procedure
21. Number of steps in procedures
22. Number of inferences per step
23. Number of information sources per step
24. Duration between steps
25. Duration of steps
26. Number of information sources per inference
27. Number of required unit conversions
28. Variety of required unit conversions
29. Number of crew members
30. Number of crew members required for each procedure
31. Number of team hierarchy levels
32. Shift length
33. Incorrect simulations
34. Inadequate communication
Interface Complexity
35. Number of displays
36. Variety of displays
37. Display size
38. Display resolution
39. Display luminance
40. Number of animated display features
41. Number of shared displays
42. Number of redundant displays
43. Distance between displays
44. Number of control devices
45. Variety of control devices
46. Number of shared control devices
47. Number of redundant control devices
48. Number of inoperable modules
49. Number of malfunctioning module
50. Distance between control devices
51. Distance between control devices and displays
52. Distance between controls and their associated displays
53. Clutter
54. Information amount
55. Number of alarms
56. Variety of alarms
57.Alarm duration
58. Variety of icons
59. Icon Size
60. Variety of fonts
61. Font size
62. Variety of colors
63. Number of visualizations
64. Text to graphics ratio
65. Refresh rate
66. Real-time update rate
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Cognitive Complexity
67. Number of years of experience in different control rooms
68. Number of years of experience in same control room
69. Number of years working with the same crew (team unfamiliarity)
70. Number of simulator hours completed per operator
71. Boredom
72. Fatigue
3. Sources of Complexity and Definitions Used in CXSurvey
1. Control Room Size:
The size of the control room.
2. Control Room Layout:
The layout of the modules and devices in the control room.
3. Ambient Noise Level:
The amount of background noise in the control room.
4. Too Many External Interruptions:
There are too many external interruptions during control room operations.
5. Time Constraints:
There is too little time to accomplish the necessary tasks.
6. Too Few Operational Mode Transitions:
There are not enough switches between
normal and emergency) during a shift.
7. Too Many Operational Mode Transitions:
There are too many switches between
normal and emergency) during a shift.
operational modes (e.g. normal, off-
operational modes (e.g. normal, off-
8. Frequency of Operational Mode Transitions:
There is a need to switch back and forth between operational
normal, off-normal, and emergency) very quickly or slowly.
modes (e.g.
9. Too Few Crew Members Available:
There are not enough crewmembers available to accomplish the necessary
tasks.
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10. Too Many Crew Members Available:
There are too many crewmembers around to accomplish the necessary tasks.
11. Too Few Items on Turnover Sheet:
There are not enough items on each turnover sheet.
12. Too Many Items on Turnover Sheet:
There are too many items on each turnover sheet.
13.Amount of Required Unit Conversions:
The number of unit conversions required completing a task.
14. Too Few Procedures:
There are not enough procedures in the control room.
15. Too Many Procedures:
There are too many procedures in the control room.
16. Inadequate Procedures:
The procedures available in the control room are insufficient in some situations.
17. Too Few Concurrently Used Procedures:
There are not enough procedures that can be used at the same time.
18. Too Many Concurrently Used Procedures:
There is a need to follow many procedures simultaneously.
19. Conflicting Procedures:
Some procedures in the control room give instructions that conflict with each
other.
20. Variety of Procedures:
There are many different types of procedures available in the control room.
21. Too Few Steps in Procedures:
There are not enough steps in each control room procedure.
22. Too Many Steps in Procedures:
There are too many steps in each control room procedure.
23. Amount of Check Points:
The amount of "if then" statements in a procedure.
24. Too Few Crew Members Required to Execute Procedure:
The number of crewmembers called for to execute a procedure is insufficient.
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25. Too Many Crew Members Required to Execute Procedure:
There are too many crewmembers called for to execute a procedure.
26. Too Few Information Sources to Make an Assessment:
There are not enough information sources available
teammates) to make a necessary assessment.
27. Too Many Information Sources to Make an Assessment:
There are too many information sources present (e.g. pan
to make an accurate assessment.
28. Level of Assessment Effort:
Level of difficulty to integrate and analyze information from
29. Team Unfamiliarity:
The crewmembers have not spent much time wo
crewmembers on their team.
30. Shift Length:
The length of each work shift in the control room.
31. Inadequate Simulator Training:
Not enough simulator training.
(e.g. panels, charts,
els, charts, teammates)
multiple sources.
rking with the other
32. Inaccurate Simulator Training:
There are inconsistencies between the simulation environment and the
33. Inadequate Communication:
There is not enough communication between crewmembers
communication that exists is not sufficient to perform all the necessary
34. Too Few HSI Panels:
There are not enough HSI panels in the control room.
35. Too Many HSI Panels:
There are too many HSI panels in the control room.
36. Variety of HSI Panels:
There are a number of different types of HSI panels in the control room
real plant.
and
tasks.
the
37. Panel Too Small:
The panels in the control room are too small.
38. Panel Too Large:
The panels in the control room are too large.
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39. Too Few Redundant Panels:
There are not enough of the same panels spread about the control room.
40. Too Many Redundant Panels:
The same panels appear too many times in the control room.
41. Too Few Control Devices:
There are not enough control devices in the control room.
42. Too Many Control Devices:
There are too many control devices in the control room.
43. Variety of Control Devices:
There are many different types of control devices in the control room.
44. Too Few Redundant Control Devices:
There are not enough of the same modules or control devices in the control
room.
45. Too Many Redundant Control Devices:
There are too many of the same modules or control devices in the control room.
46. Too Few Control Devices Shared by Different Systems:
There are not enough of the same control devices used to control multiple
systems/modules.
47. Too Many Control Devices Shared by Different Systems:
There are too many of the same control devices used to control multiple
systems/modules.
48. Variety of Colors Used for Functional Groupings:
The number of different types of colors used for functional groupings in the
control room.
49. Clutter (in displays or panels):
Presenting an excessive amount of information in a display or panel.
50. Volume of Information (in displays or panels):
The amount of information presented to the operator at any time using different
panels/displays.
51. Too Few Alarms:
There are not enough alarms in the control room.
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52. Too Many Alarms:
There are too many alarms in the control room.
53. Variety of Alarms:
There are many different types of alarms in the control room.
54. Amount of Inoperable Equipment:
Amount of equipment that is not in a safe and reliable functioning condition.
55. Amount of Malfunctioning Equipment:
Amount of equipment that is functioning incorrectly.
56. Years Experience in Same Control Room:
The number of years spent working in the same control room.
57. Experience in Other Control Rooms:
Too much experience in other control room(s) may confuse the operator.
58. Boredom:
The long durations of inactivity may increase the perceived complexity of the
control room.
59. Cognitive Fatigue:
Night shifts and long shifts may increase the perceived complexity of the control
room.
60. Stress:
The amount of stress perceived by control room staff may increase the perceived
complexity of the control room.
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Appendix C: HERA Database Analysis
As discussed in Chapter 4 each incident in HERA is organized by hundreds of sub-events.
Particular actions were coded according to conventional probabilistic risk assessment (PRA)
methods (Halbert et al., 2006). Each of the 22 events in the HERA database was examined for
the performance-shaping factor (PSF) class of complexity. Each of the PSFs that were coded as a
human error (XHE) or human success (HS) due to complexity were examined and recorded.
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S F sm
U
(positive) 1 1 3
Simultaneous tasks with high
attention demands 5 1 10 1 3 1 2
Extensive knowledge regarding
the physical layout of the plant is
required 1 1 1
Coordination required between
multiple people in multiple
locations I
Demands to track and memorize
information 1 2
Ambiguous or misleading
information present 1 3 1
Information fails to point directly
to the problem 1 2 4 1 3
System dependencies are not well
defined 1 5
Scenario demands that the
operator combine information
from different parts of the process
and information systems 3 2 3 6
Loss of plant functionality
complicates recovery path 4
Presence of multiple faults 1
Problems in differentiating
important from less important
information 1 2 5
Other 1
Worker distracted/ interrupted 1 1
High number of alarms 1 1
Weak causal connections exist
General ambiguity of the event 3 3
Dependencies well defined (pos)
Few or no concurrent tasks (pos)_____
Difficulties in obtaining feedback
Complexity Sums 11 5 0 10 20 2 8 2 11 1 15 12
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C c tp
0 03
(J*1)
7;
Human Errors (XHEs) & Human CA CA
Successes (HSs) Performance- X XX
Shaping Factors in Complexity---------- ------------ - -
Causal connections apparent
(positive)
Simultaneous tasks with high
attention demands 1 1 3 1
Extensive knowledge regarding
the physical layout of the plant is
required
Coordination required between
multiple people in multiple
locations 10
Demands to track and memorize
information
Ambiguous or misleading
information present
Information fails to point directly
to the problem 1 13
System dependencies are not well
defined
Scenario demands that the
operator combine information
from different parts of the process
and information systems1
Loss of plant functionality
complicates recovery path
Presence of multiple faults
Problems in differentiating
important from less important
information 32 18
Other
Worker distracted/ interrupted
High number of alarms
Weak causal connections exist 1 5
General ambiguity of the event
Dependencies well defined (pos) 1 ____ ___
Few or no concurrent tasks ( os) _____I __
Difficulties in obtaining feedback 1 7
Complexity Sums 2 3 8 1 0 0 68 0 18 2 0 0
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C14
Human Errors (XHEs) & Human WOC
Successes (HSs) Performance- X X X X X
Shaping Factors in Complexity
Causal connections apparent
Simultaneous tasks with high
attention demands 4
Extensive knowledge regarding
the physical layout of the plant is
required
Coordination required between
multiple people in multiple
locations1
Demands to track and memorize
information
Ambiguous or misleading
information present
Information fails to point directly
to the problem
System dependencies are not well
defined
Scenario demands that the
operator combine information
from different parts of the process
Loss of plant functionality
complicates recovery path
Presence of multiple faults1
Problems in differentiating
important from less important
information 2
Other
Worker distracted/ interrupted1
High number of alarms
Weak causal connections exist 3
General ambiguity of the event 4 1
Dependencies well defined (pos)
Few or no concurrent tasks (pos)
Difficulties in obtaining feedback
Complexity Sums 0 11 0- 1 -r0 1 1 0 10 111 0 14 1
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CU E
Successes (HSs) Performance- X X X X Complexity Type
Shaping Factors in Complexity Totals
Causal connections apparent
(positive) 5
Simultaneous tasks with high
attention demands 11 3 1 48
Extensive knowledge regarding
the physical layout of the plant is
required 2 8
Coordination required between
multiple people in multiple
locations 3 4 19
Demands to track and memorize
information 3
Ambiguous or misleading
information present 4 11
Information fails to point directly
to the problem 4 29
System dependencies are not well
defined 1 8 1 17
Scenario demands that the
operator combine information
from different parts of the
process and information systems 2 17
Loss of plant functionality
complicates recovery path 1 2 7
Presence of multiple faults 2 5 10
Problems in differentiating
important from less important
information 2 62
Other 1
Worker distracted/ interrupted 3
High number of alarms 1 3
Weak causal connections exist I I
General ambiguity of the event 12
Dependencies well defined (pos) 2
Few or no concurrent tasks (pos) 1
Difficulties in obtaining feedback 8
Complexity Sums 1 9 30 3 2 1 12 1 277
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Appendix D: STAMP Analysis
STAMP Analysis of Salem 1 Incident Based on HERA Database
Overview
On the morning of Thursday, April 7, 1994, the Salem Nuclear Power Plant was experiencing an intrusion
of grass from the Delaware River in the intake structure for the circulating water (CW) system. As a
result, the plant was not operating at full power and two off-duty supervisory staff members were
positioned near the CW pumps to help restore them to service should they trip. The reactor operator was
performing a number of tasks, including manually manipulating the control rods, adding boron as
necessary, transferring electrical loads, and maintaining the control room log.
By 10:15 AM, the CW system screens had become so clogged that there was a significant water level
drop across them and the weight of the grass was starting to cause shear pins to fail; a minute later, the
water level drop had increased enough to cause the pumps to trip.
In response, the control room operators began to reduce the load across the turbines and increase the rate
of turbine power reduction as high as 8% per minute. The Senior Nuclear Shift Supervisor (SNSS) left the
control room area to help restart one of the CW pumps to try to prevent a turbine trip, leaving only the
Nuclear Shift Supervisor (NSS) and two licensed operators in the control room. When the operators tried
to turn this pump on after the SNSS had caused an override of a safety-locking feature, the pump tripped.
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A series of alarms began to sound as the turbine load reduction finished. At this point, the reactor operator
(RO) began to move the plant's electrical loads to offsite sources. While he was doing this, the NSS
started to withdraw the control rods in response to indications of overcooling; however, when he told the
RO to continue to raise reactor power (and thus temperature), he did not mention this fact and also did not
provide specific enough instructions to allow the RO to correctly withdraw the rods. This led to a second
trip of the CW pumps at 10:46 and a reactor trip at 10:47, which initiated an automatic safety injection
(SI) that began to fill the pressurizer. In response, the operator stopped the SI, but not before the
pressurizer had become solid. The steam generator (SG) pressure also began to increase, but the normal
automatic relief system did not work properly, so an alternative automatic relief system actuated. This in
turn led to enough of a decrease in primary pressure that there was another series of automatic safety
injections, which could have led to an overpressure condition; however, the operators successfully took
manual control of the pressure relief valves to prevent this.
At 1:16 PM, as a result of the malfunctioning of a number of automatic systems, including multiple trains
of the safety injection system, plant management declared an Alert, which mobilized further resources to
help the operators recover from the situation.
Subsequently, the operators restored the necessary systems and plant conditions to allow for a plant cool
down. The Alert was terminated at 8:20 PM, and the plant entered Cold Shutdown at 11:24 AM the
following morning.
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Timeline of Events
Control Room Turbine Hall Other
Time Reactor Operator Balance of Plant Other
_______________________ Operator
Loads on the screens
have become so
heavy that shear
10:15 pins are failing and
AM there is a 1-1.5 foot
drop in water level
across the trash
racks
Control rods Water level10:16 switched to Begins turbine load differential across
AM automatic reduction screens reaches 10ft;
13B CW pump trips
Increases rate of
1A7 turbine load 13A CW pump trips
reduction
Increases rate of
a1ox turbine load 13B CW pump trips10:32 reduction as high as
8% per minute
SNSS SNSS manually lifts
10:33 Control rods leaves contacts on 12A CW
AM switched back to control pump water box to
manual control override protective
room interlock
Operators
10:34 try to 12A CW pump trips
AM restart 12A again
CW pump
Trying to reduce
10:37 reactor power and
AM temperature and add
boron as necessary
Operators
10:39 restart 13A 13A and 13B CW
AM and 13B pumps back on
CW pumps
133
Low-low
10:40 condenser
AM vacuum
alarm
activates
10:42 Idles a feedwater
AM pump
Begins to switch
10:43 onsite electrical Load reduction
AM loads to offsite complete
power supplies
Low-low
10:44 Tave
AM bistables
trip
10:45
Finishes switching
electrical loads;
begins to withdraw
control rods; notices
Tave is below
minimum critical
temperature;
monitors Tave (but
not reactor power)
NSS begins
to withdraw
control
rods, then
stops and
tells RO to
do so
10:46 13A and 13B CW
AM pumps trip again
Reactor
trips;
automatic
SI on train
10:47 A; ECCS
AM pumps
start; main
feedwater
regulating
valves
close
10:49 Enter procedure 1-EOP-TRIP-1 (Reactor
AM Trip or Safety Injection)
Manually
10:53 initiatemain
feedwater
isolation
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10:58
AM
Primary
coolant
temperature
begins to
increase;
manually
initiate
main steam
isolation
and
reposition
components
to expected
positions;
manually
trip main
feed numns
Declarati
on of
Unusual
Event
Reset SI
Train A
11:05 with
AM automatic
actuation in
"blocked"
condition
Transition
to
procedure
11:10 1-EOP-
AM TRIP-3(Safety
Injection
Terminatio
n)
Fix
incorrectly
11:15 positioned
AM letdown
isolation
valve
Pressurizer
is solid;
power
operated
relief
11-3 valves
(PORVs)
open to
relieve
water to
Pressurizer
Relief Tank
(PRT)
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Controlling reactor coolant system via main
steam atmospheric relief valves and chemical
and volume control system; enters Technical
Specification Action Statement 3.0.3 because
of two blocked automatic SI trains
Two SG
safety
valves lift
to release
11:26 built-up
AM steam;
automatic
SI actuated;
initiate
manual SI
Plant in
11:30 solid plant
AM pressure
control
Both SI
trains
locked and
unavailable
Number 11
main steam
relief valve
opens
halfway,
but is
immediatel
y closed
Alert1:16 PM Begin heatup of pressurizer declared
NRC
enters
monitori
ng phase
of
1:36 PM Normal
Response
Mode of
Incident
Response
Plan
Technica
I Support
Center2:10 PM Reestablished steam space in pressurizer staffed to
assist
operators
4:30 PM Restored pressurizer level to 50%
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11:43
AM
12:54
PM
137
Plant
5:15 PM cooldown
starts
8:20 PM Alert8:20M ______________ ends
1:06 AM shutdown
11:24 Cold
AM shutdown
Safety Control Structure
I
S
esJ
138
On the left half of the diagram, the control structure connected with the NRC is shown. While some of the
internal structures are present, most are not directly relevant to this incident, so beyond this point, this
entire section will be considered a single entity and referred to as the NRC.
On the right of the diagram are the most important aspects of the plant's safety control structure with
respect to this incident. Although the plant has two units, this incident primarily concerned Unit 1, so the
emphasis is placed on the Unit 1 control room in this diagram. Personnel are outlined in black, reports are
outlined in purple, and equipment is outlined in red.
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STAMP Analysis
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NRC
Safety Requirements and Constraints Violated
- none
Inadequate Decisions and Control Actions
0 none
Inadequate Controls
9 none
Context
0 Given incomplete information by plant's communicator
Inadequate Communication and Coordination
- Given incomplete information by plant's communicator
Mental Model Flaws
- none
Plant Management
Safety Requirements and Constraints Violated
Must fix problems in a timely manner
- Must promptly identify and correct significant conditions
adverse to quality
- Must provide adequate training, guidance, and procedures
to deal with grass transients, solid pressurizers, and plant
operation with the reactor temperature below the
minimum necessary for critical operation
- Must adequately understand and emphasize safety aspects
of tasks (safety first)
- Must provide management expectations in operating
procedures for when operators should stop trying to keep
the plant running and trip the reactor or turbines
" Must ensure that Notification of Unusual Event to NRC
contains all relevant and important information
Inadequate Decisions and Control Actions
- Allowed for (and sanctioned) degraded conditions and
workarounds
Inadequate Controls
Inadequate rules
Context
* Grass intrusions and resulting reactor power transients
were seen as routine
Inadequate Communication and Coordination
- Failed to clearly express expectations for staff performance
Mental Model Flaws
Saw grass intrusions and resulting reactor power
transients as routine
- Did not appreciate importance of safety
- Accepted degraded conditions and workarounds
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Quality Assurance/Oversight Personnel
Safety Requirements and Constraints Violated
" Must revise FSAR and conduct complete safety evaluation
when making changes
- Must promptly identify and correct significant conditions
adverse to quality
- Must provide adequate training, guidance, and procedures
to deal with grass transients, solid pressurizers, and plant
operation with the reactor temperature below the
minimum necessary for critical operation
- Must provide management expectations in operating
procedures for when operators should stop trying to keep
the plant running and trip the reactor or turbines
Inadequate Decisions and Control Actions
- Allowed for degraded conditions and workarounds
Inadequate Controls
- Inadequate rules
Context
e Grass intrusions and resulting reactor power transients
were seen as routine
Inadequate Communication and Coordination
* none
Mental Model Flaws
Saw grass intrusions and resulting reactor power
transients as routine
Accepted degraded conditions and workarounds
Technical Support Center
Safety Requirements and Constraints Violated
* none
Inadequate Decisions and Control Actions
0 none
Inadequate Controls
none
Context
- Unusual Event and Alert declared
Inadequate Communication and Coordination
* none
Mental Model Flaws
- none
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Training Personnel
Safety Requirements and Constraints Violated
- Must provide adequate training to deal with grass
transients, solid pressurizers, and plant operation with the
reactor temperature below the minimum necessary for
critical operation
" Must adequately emphasize safety aspects of tasks (safety
first)
" Must explain importance of "Yellow Path" procedures
Inadequate Decisions and Control Actions
none
Inadequate Controls
- none
Context
0 none
Inadequate Communication and Coordination
- none
Mental Model Flaws
- Did not appreciate importance of safety
Engineering Personnel
Safety Requirements and Constraints Violated
- Must promptly identify and correct significant conditions
adverse to quality
Must restore 12A pump circuit breaker after maintenance
Inadequate Decisions and Control Actions
- none
Inadequate Controls
- Insufficient instrumentation available to detect cause of
issues
Context
* none
Inadequate Communication and Coordination
- none
Mental Model Flaws
0 none
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Senior Nuclear Shift Supervisor
Safety Requirements and Constraints Violated
" Must remain in control room to assist during transients
* Must adequately emphasize safety aspects of tasks (safety
first)
Must adhere to procedures
Must remain in supervisory role
Inadequate Decisions and Control Actions
* Allowed for degraded conditions and workarounds
" Left control room during transient
Inadequate Controls
- none
Context
- Plant operating below full power
12A CW pump out of service; other CW pumps tripped
during incident
Many distractions in control room
Needed to remain in communication with CW operators,
Unit 2 operators, and turbine hall operators
Inadequate Communication and Coordination
Failed to adequately reinforce management expectations
for staff performance
Mental Model Flaws
- Did not appreciate importance of safety
Saw trip of reactor or turbines as last resort only
- Saw grass intrusions and resulting reactor power
transients as routine
Accepted degraded conditions and workarounds
- Did not recognize importance of "Yellow Path" procedures
Nuclear Shift Supervisor
Safety Requirements and Constraints Violated
- Must maintain supervisory role
- Must communicate any changes in control rod status to RO
Must give RO adequate instructions to increase reactor
power
Inadequate Decisions and Control Actions
- Allowed for degraded conditions and workarounds
- Did not tell RO that rods had been manipulated
Inadequate Controls
" Inadequate rules
- Initially failed to notice overcooling reactor
* Initially missed alignment of one isolation valve
Context
Plant operating below full power
- 12A CW pump out of service; other CW pumps tripped
during incident
Senior supervisor in control room once SNSS left
Many distractions in control room
Needed to remain in communication with CW operators,
Unit 2 operators, and turbine hall operators
- Understaffed control room, especially once SNSS left
Reactor trip
- Logic disagreements between SI trains
- Unusual Event and Alert declared
Solid pressurizer
Automatic function of main steam valves (MS10s) didn't
work properly
Inadequate Communication and Coordination
Failed to adequately reinforce management expectations
for staff performance
- Failed to tell RO he had manipulated control rods
- Failed to give RO adequate guidance during reactor power
increase
Mental Model Flaws
- Did not appreciate importance of safety
- Saw trip of reactor or turbines as last resort only
* Saw grass intrusions and resulting reactor power
transients as routine
- Accepted degraded conditions and workarounds
" Did not recognize RCS heatup or SG pressure increase
Reactive rather than proactive mode - followed
procedures, but did not see "big picture"
Did not recognize importance of "Yellow Path" procedures
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Reactor Operator
Safety Requirements and Constraints Violated
* none
Inadequate Decisions and Control Actions
Did not mention reactor overcooling to NSS
Monitored Tave rather than reactor power while raising
reactor power
Inadequate Controls
- Inadequate rules
- Initially failed to notice overcooling reactor
* Initially missed alignment of one isolation valve
- Did not recognize RCS heatup or SG pressure increase
Context
- Unreasonable and unclear management expectations
Given no additional assistance, even though grass
transients were expected
- Control rods were under manual control
- Plant operating below full power
- 12A CW pump out of service; other CW pumps tripped
during incident
- Needed to manually keep reactor power comparable to
turbine power despite abnormally high turbine load
reduction rate
- Many distractions in control room
* Management pressure to avoid reactor trip
* Overburdened - in charge of rod control, boron additions,
electrical load transfer, control room log, and reading
procedures to BOP operator when necessary
* Needed to remain in communication with CW operators,
Unit 2 operators, and turbine hall operators
* Understaffed control room, especially once SNSS left
- Reactor trip
- Logic disagreements between SI trains
Unusual Event and Alert declared
* Solid pressurizer
Inadequate Communication and Coordination
0 Failed to point out reactor overcooling to NSS
Mental Model Flaws
* Saw trip of reactor or turbines as last resort only
- Saw grass intrusions and resulting reactor power
transients as routine
" Reactive rather than proactive mode - followed
procedures, but did not see "big picture"
- Did not recognize importance of "Yellow Path" procedures
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Balance of Plant Operator
Safety Requirements and Constraints Violated
none
Inadequate Decisions and Control Actions
* Went to abnormally high turbine load reduction rate (8%)
* Did not pay enough attention to increasing SG pressure
Inadequate Controls
" Inadequate rules
* Initially failed to notice overcooling reactor
* Initially missed alignment of one isolation valve
* Did not recognize RCS heatup or SG pressure increase
Context
* Unreasonable and unclear management expectations
- Given no additional assistance, even though grass
transients were expected
* Plant operating below full power
- 12A CW pump out of service; other CW pumps tripped
during incident
Many distractions in control room
- Management pressure to avoid reactor trip
- Needed to remain in communication with CW operators,
Unit 2 operators, and turbine hall operators
- Understaffed control room, especially once SNSS left
* Reactor trip
- Logic disagreements between SI trains
- Unusual Event and Alert declared
" Solid pressurizer
Responsible for conducting actions read by RO from
procedures
Automatic function of main steam valves (MS10s) didn't
work properly
Inadequate Communication and Coordination
- none
Mental Model Flaws
Saw trip of reactor or turbines as last resort only
Saw grass intrusions and resulting reactor power
transients as routine
* Reactive rather than proactive mode - followed procedures,
but didn't see "big picture"
" Didn't recognize importance of "Yellow Path" procedures
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Conclusions and Recommendations
Many of the root causes of the Salem incident ultimately stemmed from improper mindsets and attitudes.
There was a strong focus on continued production and operation and an acceptance of workarounds to
avoid paying for proper maintenance, even if this might pose a safety risk. Operators were trained just
effectively enough to be able to follow specific procedures, but were not given sufficient training to be
able to really understand situations. In most cases, this level of training was sufficient since the operators
only really needed to be able to find the correct procedures based on the plant state; however, in this
instance, it kept the crew from more effectively dealing with some of the issues and led to some of the
complications in this event.
What follows is a list of some recommendations for improvement based on this analysis. First, there
needs to be a shift away from the current mindset to do everything possible to keep the plant running at all
times, even at the expense of safety. Operators need to be made aware of situations in which it might be
safer to trip the reactor and turbines and trained to think of this as a possible course of action. Second,
management needs to be willing to spend the money to properly fix significant issues in order to ensure
the continued safe operation of the plant; if necessary, the NRC should impose time limits on how long a
licensee can wait to fix a problem once it has been found. Third, management should understand that just
because an event happens often does not make it "routine" and that some recurring situations, like the
grass transient, should really be treated as emergency situations. Operators should be given sufficient
training to be able to understand and correct the causes of issues that could arise during these events
rather than just enough to let them compensate for systems lost as a result of these issues, particularly if
they are expected to consistently make decisions on an ad hoc basis. Still, operators need to be aware that
they should follow procedures except in exceptional circumstances, since the procedures are generally the
most reliable way to deal with an issue. There should also be extra help available to the control room to
ensure that all critical systems can continue to be monitored even if additional emergency actions need to
be taken, and operators should be aware which systems need to be monitored most closely. Operators
should be aware of instances in which there might be multiple acceptable procedures or what to do if
there don't seem to be any perfect procedures and how to use systems like the "yellow path". Fourth,
operators should be encouraged to ask for clarification if they have any questions at all about directions
they were given and encouraged to keep constantly open lines of communication among the people in the
control room, especially if one person alters something that impacts the systems under someone else's
care. Fifth, there should be stronger double checks to ensure that all procedures are carried out and
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completed correctly, including both operating room procedures and maintenance procedures. Finally, the
people responsible for contact with the NRC need to be aware what information the NRC needs to in
order to be helpful and not simply default to providing the minimum possible amount of information.
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Appendix F: CXViz (Complexity Visualization) User Guide
CXViz (Complexity Visualization) is an interactive network visualization and analysis tool
based on the Graph Exploration System (GUESS) (Eytan, 2006; Eytan and Miryung, 2007),
adapted to specifically to analyze Complexity Source Networks (CSNs). This system was
implemented in a language called Jython (an implementation of Python for Java Virtual Machine
(JVM)). Two versions of the system were developed: 1) Developer version. This version is a
desktop application to let the researcher edit the sources of complexity and update the evidence
database, and 2) View-only version. This version is an applet that was uploaded to MIT Humans
and Automation Laboratory's (HAL) website4 to let NRC researchers and other lab affiliates to
view and interact with the software.
CXViz interface can be broken down into five main sections (Figure 33):
e Menu bar
- Vertical toolbar
- Database window
- Visualization window
- Side-by-side network displays (not shown in Figure 33)
The following sub-sections discuss each section in more detail.
F.1: The Visualization Window
This is the main window of the system, which displays the nodes and links of the network.
While it is arguably the most important feature of the system, it has little functionality and is
mainly used to visualize the network under investigation.
Graph element modification: right-clicking on a node or link allows the user to either modify
its properties or remove it (Figure 34).
4 http://web.mit.edu/aeroastro/labs/halab/cxviz.shtml
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Figure 33. The CXViz interface.
Removing a node or link in this way removes it permanently and the user can only get it back by
re-loading the data (by hitting the "Refresh" button, choosing an "Original" layout, or selecting
the site again from the Site Selection box). Every time a change is made to the CSN, the
statistics table will be updated to reflect these removed nodes and links.
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Figure 34. Modifying nodes (left) or links (right)
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F.2: The Menu Bar
The menu bar appears at the very top of the applet and contains the following menu headers:
File, Display, Layout, and Help (Figure 35).
Fft DHOpIr LeoW H
Figure 35. Menu bar
File
e Exit: This closes the applet popup window.
e Save: Saves changes to the current CSN. O.
Figure 36. Color selection
Display
- Center: Centers the network currently displayed in the visualization window.
e Background Color: Brings up a color selection window that allows the user to select the
desired background color of the visualization window (Figure 36).
Layout
When the user selects an incident using the site selector, CXViz uses the embedded complexity
chain to visualize the network. In order to enable the user to choose a layout algorithm to impose
on the currently loaded network, several graph layout algorithms are provided (Figure 37).
Currently, ten algorithms are provided. These are Bin Pack, GEM, Circular, Physics, Kamada-
Kawai, Fruchterman-Rheingold, Spring, MDS, Random and Radial. Table 11 summarizes the
definition of each algorithm.
sttPhysics
connected No. Knnade-a-a
pa n Ndes
Node Degi Swig
Radia
Figure 37. Layout algorithms
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Table 11. Algorithms used for network layouts.
Algorithm Definition Sample
Bin Packing Nodes of different degrees must be
packed into a finite number (in this case
2) of bins (i.e., groups) of a certain
capacity in a way that minimizes the
number of bins used. This algorithm
could be used to separate the nodes with
no connection (i.e., orphan nodes).
GEM A tree generation algorithm that could
be used to minimize the link
intersections.
Circular Outer planar drawing algorithm that uses
the smallest possible number of
crossings.
Physics A type of force-directed (Spring)
algorithm in which the forces are
physics-based (i.e., nodes with certain
properties, in this case those with links,
attracts each other). This algorithm
could be used to visualize the large
component (the connected part) of the
network.
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Kamada-Kawai I
The Fruchterman-Reingold Algorithm is
another type of force-directed layout
algorithm, which considers a force
between any two nodes. In this
algorithm, steel rings represent the nodes
and the edges are springs between them.
The attractive force is analogous to the
spring force and the repulsive force is
analogous to the electrical force. The
basic idea is to minimize the energy of
the system by moving the nodes and
changing the forces between them. This
algorithm promotes a view that
minimizes unnecessary intersections.
Spring The Spring Layout Algorithm is the
simplest force-directed layout algorithm.
The antigravity effect separated the
connected nodes from the orphan nodes.
*,t~
* ~ 
.-.
*~W : ~
The Kamada-Kawai Algorithm is a force
directed layout algorithm, which
considers a force between any two
nodes. In this algorithm, steel rings
represent the nodes and the edges are
springs between them. The attractive
force is analogous to the spring force
and the repulsive force is analogous to
the electrical force. The basic idea is to
minimize the energy of the system by
moving the nodes and changing the
forces between them. This algorithm
produces a graph where edges have
more or less equal length.
Fruchteman-
Rheigold
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Help
* Error Log: In case of a bug in the program, this item brings up the stack trace of the
error. Sending a copy of this trace, as well as a description of what was being done at the
time of the error, back to the developer allows for fast bug fixes automatically (Figure
38).
Wmsql.SQLExceplton Column constraints are not accepable In sttement [ALTER TABL
avi Exteption Column constraints are not acceptabte In statement LTER TABLE
at org hs qIdb.Jdbc.il. sclException(Unknown Source)
at org.hsqldb.ldbc.jdbcStatementfetchResut(Unknown Source)
at org.hsqldb.idbc idbcStatementexecuteUpdate(Unknown Source)
at com.hp.hpl.guess.db.D8Selver update(DEServerlava:850)
at com hp hp1 guess db.DBServer update(DBServer java 862)
at com hp.hpl.guess.dbD88errerv ater(DBServeriava:I 332)
at com hp tpi guess db.DBServer p ocessEdgeDef(DBServerJava 1595) ~
Figure 38. Error log window
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MDS This algorithm uses the weight attribute .
(Multidimensional of links to define their lengths. Using
Scaling) this algorithm, the main interactions (in
terms of weight) can be easily identified
in a highly connected network.
Random Randomly lays out nodes while
minimizing the collision between the
nodes. This algorithm could be used to
clearly view nodes in a cluttered CSN.
Radial Places the center node in the center and
places nodes connected to it at
rauntioning moduleincreasing radii based on shortest path. 1ei
Using this algorithm, the interactions for umber of
a specific source could be analyzed.
Source: BOrner et al. (2003); Weimao and Brner (2005), and Network Workbech
(http://nwb.slis.indiana.edu)
Other functionalities such as a searchable help function are under development and will be added
in the future.
F.3: The Vertical Toolbar
This vertical panel on the left side of the applet in Figure 33 contains most of the data-
manipulation tools available to the user. It allows the user to change the level of details
displayed, view simple statistics of the currently loaded graph, and choose from view options
that hide or reveal categories of nodes, and manipulate the display or individual nodes.
Site Selector
Site selector provides a list of incidents in HERA plus the Three Mile Island incident. The user
may choose from this list by clicking anywhere in the selection box, then scrolling to and
clicking the desired site. This list includes data collected for 22 nuclear power sites as well as 6
different versions of the aggregate network that includes the aggregate of all the possible links
and nodes and their aggregate weights (Figure 39).
Aggregate-HWLER
Aggregate-HW_NLER
Aggregate-W_NLER
Browns Fery I
Figure 39. Site selector
169
Different versions of aggregate network were provided for two reasons: 1) the networks with
aggregate weights for links or nodes are overly cluttered. 2) Although HERA was selected as the
main resource for identifying the interactions between the sources of complexity, based on its
high quality of information, other incident report databases such as Licensee Event Report (LER)
may provide more evidence for the existence of identified sources. Although the non-HERA
evidences cannot be used to create CSNs, this information can be added to the aggregate network
for analysis.
The 6 aggregate networks were categorized by weights (weights for both nodes and links,
weights for only nodes, and no weights), and by whether the network includes the data from LER
database or not. See Table 12 for the aggregate network terminology.
1. The aggregate network without weights, including the LER data (coded as no-weight or
"Aggregate-NWLER", Figure 40).
2. The aggregate network without weights, but including the LER data (coded as no-weight
or "Aggregate-NWNLER").
3. The aggregate network visualizing the aggregate node weights but not link weights,
including the LER data (coded as half-weight or "Aggregate-HWLER", Figure 41).
4. The aggregate network visualizing the aggregate node weights but not link weights, not
including the LER data (coded as half-weight or "Aggregate-HWNLER").
5. The aggregate network visualizing both weights for nodes and weights for links,
including the LER data (coded as full-weight or "Aggregate-WLER", Figure 42).
6. The aggregate network visualizing both weights for nodes and weights for links, not
including the LER data (coded as full-weight or "Aggregate-WNLER").
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Figure 40. Aggregate no-weight network with LER data
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Figure 41. Aggregate half-weight network with LER data.
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Figure 42. Aggregate full-weight network with LER data
Table 12. Aggregate network terminology.
LER data included LER data not included
No Weights Aggregate-NWLER Aggregate-NWNLER
Weight Half Weights Aggregate-HWLER Aggregate-HWNLER
Full Weights Aggregate-WLER Aggregate-WNLER
Statistics
The statistics table provides important network characteristics information about the currently
loaded network (Figure 43). The statistics are calculated based on the nodes and links on the
screen; whenever these are either removed or added the statistics update to reflect the change. As
previously discussed in Section 4.6, these network characteristics measure connectivity of a
network, which in turn could be used as a direct measure of complexity. Table 13 summarizes
these statistics.
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Stat Value
Connected Nodes 44
Orphan Nodes 28
Total Links 417
Avg Node Degree 18.955
CPL 2.058
Clustering Coefficient 0.825
CPL with Orphans 0.762
Figure 43. Statistics section
Table 13. Network characteristics information
Characteristic Definitions
Connected Nodes Number of nodes with a link to other nodes
Orphan Nodes Number of nodes with no link to other nodes
Total Links Total number of links
The average number of links connected to
Average Node Degree
nodes
Characteristic Path Length (CPL) Average distance between pairs of nodes
Clustering Coefficient The probability that two neighbor nodes for
each node are connected
CPL with Orphans Characteristic Path Length considering the
orphan nodes
The probability distribution of the node degrees
Degree Distribution (Under Development)
over the whole network
View Options
The "View Options" box contains options that the lets the user to change the level of detail
shown on the visualization window. The color-coded "Complexity Levels" refer to the different
types of complexity sources in the complexity chain previously discussed in section 4.5, and
disabling/enabling the checkboxes hide/reveal the sources and their links respectively (Figure
44).
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InterfaceCX
U Cgriite CK
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3-- Too 5 Modes(b weigh)
7Top 5 Nod* (by dow)
Top 5 Ltcs (by WeGht)
Figure 44. View options
The Complexity levels view option could be used in three ways: 1) Investigating different levels
of complexity in isolation, 2) Investigating the interactions between different levels of
complexity, and 3) Investigating the effects of removing different levels of complexity on the
network characteristics (Figure 45).
~L)JXA..
mMO-
(a)
U
(c)
(b)
I l~--~~
*
U? --
(d)
Figure 45. a) Original CSN for the Salem unit 1 incident, b) and the organizational complexity
level of Salem 1 incident, c) the connections between the environmental and cognitive
complexity levels, and d) Salem 1 CSN without the organizational complexity level.
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TIM",
The "Filter" options give the user three ways to highlight important characteristics of the visible
network. Checking one (or more) of the boxes highlights the relevant sources or links while
graying out the rest of the network. Each filter option is described briefly in Table 14. Figure 46
shows the situation in which all three filters were used for the "Browns Ferry 1" incident.
Table 14. View filter options
View Filter Definition
Highlights (in YELLOW) the top 5 sources
Top 5 Nodes (by weight) according to the number of HERA events
found for each source
Highlights (in RED) the top 5 sources
Top 5 Nodes (by degree) according to the number of links each source
has to other sources
Highlights (in BLACK) the top 5 links
Top 5 Links (by weight) according to the number of HERA events
shared by the linked sources
Note: Sources that fall within the three top 5 filters are highlighted in ORANGE.
F Diply ILayOut Hb
Sa Vakie
ConrctedNodes 16
Nodes 56
otLks* 62
vgNode Degee 7,75
CPL 1.942
erng Coeffient 0.834
wth Or*as 0.091
Or 0ganatIonal CX
e ntrface CX
v' Cogitwe CX
Fiter
STop 5 Nodes (by weigit)
v. Top 5 Nodes (by degree)
Remove Soues
Mde Orpharts
Rsed(e
Figure 46. Using filter view options
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Tools
The function buttons in the "Tools" box control the graphical window and allow the user to
manipulate the chosen network (Figure 47).
Cantar aph
" Change Layout: brings up a dialog box asking the user to choose a new layout (Figure
48). Similar to the layout option in the menu bar, the user can choose an algorithm to
impose on the currently loaded network (see Table 12). The user may choose from the
same choices listen under the "Layout" 'menu item, as well as "Original", which brings up
the original network embodied in the complexity chain.
MdY~ Ots [rph1n
PIease chose a "W:
Figure 48. Layout options window
* Remove Sources: brings up a dialog box asking the user for the criteria that should be
used to remove nodes (Figure 49).
176
Remove sources by:
OK 'Cancel
Figure 49. Remove source window
Currently, the user can choose to remove nodes based on their weight (size), or by the
number of links they have. Once a choice is made, the user can input the desired
minimum. For node weight, this dialog box looks like Figure 50.
Note: namst we* is 10
Remove des Wth west greater than:
I OK C nced
Figure 50. Filter by node weight
The dialogue box for node link number is similar to the node weight dialogue box.
e Hide Orphans: hides the nodes that are not connected by links
e Reveal (all): restores all hidden and/or removed elements to their last positions
* Reset: restores the network to its original state
F.4: The Database Window
This window appears at the bottom of the applet and displays the data from which the nodes and
links are made (Figure 51). In the first column are the identified sources of complexity, grouped
according to complexity types (i.e. environmental, organizational, interface and cognitive). In
the second column are the HERA incident sub-events that have been identified to support the
complexity source for the currently loaded site. The weight (size) of a node in the graphical
window corresponds to the number of sub-events that have been identified for that particular
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complexity source. The weight (width) of a link corresponds to the number of sub-events shared
by the two sources it connects.
Comleft Sources HERA Sub-events
ctorom size (1)
Conrorl room
*Available time (3) HS6,7,12,113,14,115,17,19,20,21 C18.9
Figure 51. The database window
Clicking a row in the table will select the corresponding node in the graphical window, which
will then zoom and center on it. Likewise, clicking a node on the graph causes the view to zoom
and center on it, and causes the data table to scroll to the corresponding row of data and highlight
it. Currently, the data table is not editable, but may in the future allow the user to add sub-events
and complexity sources to the database.
F.5: Side-by-side network displays
A feature that is currently in development is the ability to display two networks in a split screen
mode. Two drop down menus will allow the user to select the networks to display. These menus
will be on a second tab on the left-hand side of the screen. The statistics for both networks will
also appear in this panel in a setup similar to what is currently used for a single network. This
feature will allow the user to compare two networks more easily than the program currently
allows.
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Appendix G: Network Statistics for 22 Incidents in HERA
Total Links Avg Node CPL
Do est
m 15 57 51 6.8 2.371 0.856 0.097
6.0
8.818
17.103
0
1.0
3.818
6.889
3.111
14.467
ena
W1
IMI
1.6
1.896
1.574
0
1.0
1,764
1.954
2.0
1.736
1.762
1.0
1.333
29 4.143 2.0
5 2.0 1.5
fP 3 69 1.333 1.333 0.0 0.0020
U2 4 68 2 1.0 1.0 0 0.0010
8 64
4 68
3.0
2.5
1.0
8.308
7.091
1.929 0.739
1.333 0.833
1.0
1.603
1.927
0
0.873
0.889
0.021
0.0030
0.0
0.049
0.041
E AU 16 56 62 7.75 1.942 0.834 0.091
re, CPL: Characteristic path length and CC: Clustering coefficient
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Connected Orphan
Nodes Nodes
CPL with CC
Orphans
0.948
0.826
0.845
0
0
0.789
0.842
0,758
0.833
0.878
0
0.0
0.028
0.171
0.25
0
0.0
0.038
0.117
0.028
0.295
0.014
0.0
0.0020
10 2.857
1 1.0
2 1.333
7 65
2 70
3 69
0.806 0.071
0.722 0.0060
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Appendix H: CXSurvey Consent Form
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN
NON-BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH
Automation and HSI Complexity in Advanced Reactors
You are asked to participate in a research study conducted by Farzan Sasangohar (student investigator)
and Professor Mary Cummings PhD, (Principal Investigator) from the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology (M.I.T.). Please read the information below, and ask questions about anything you do not
understand, and then decide whether or not to participate.
PARTICIPATION AND WITHDRAWAL
Your participation in this study is completely voluntary; you may withdraw from it at any time without
consequences of any kind.
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY
The overall objective of this study is to develop a better understanding of how humans perceive
complexity in the NPP control room environment. The goals of this study are to evaluate the proposed
sources of complexity within NPP control rooms and to, generally, further our understanding of
complexity to inform guidelines for evaluating NPP control rooms.
PROCEDURES
If you volunteer to participate in this study, we would ask you to do complete the following steps:
e Complete an informed consent form.
- Answer a series of questions about complexity on an apple iPad.
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The total time for this interview is approximately 30 minutes.
POTENTIAL BENEFITS
Your efforts will provide critical insight into the human perceived complexity of control rooms and will
help the research team to develop complexity guidelines to inform the review of control room designs.
CONFIDENTIALITY
This study is anonymous. You will be assigned a subject number, which will be used in all data files to
guarantee anonymity. We do not keep any information that is obtained in connection with this study and
that can be identified with you.
IDENTIFICATION OF INVESTIGATORS
If you have any questions or concerns about the research, please feel free to contact the Principal
Investigator, Mary L. Cummings, at (617) 252-1512, e-mail, missyc@mit.edu, and her address is 77
Massachusetts Avenue, Room 33-305, Cambridge, MA, 02139. The student investigator is Farzan
Sasangohar and he may be contacted by telephone at (617) 768-7771 or via email at farzans@mit.edu.
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Appendix I: CXSurvey Screenshots
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In this page interviewees view a CSN based on the rating they provide in the previous section. IN
order to mitigate clutter only the sources that were rated as either 4 (agree) or 5 (strongly agree)
were shown here. The interviewees were asked to identify potential interactions between the
sources by drawing a link between pairs of nodes.
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For example in this interface the interviewee has identified 5 links between the sources. Also as
shown in the figure, the interviewee can choose a link weight on a 5-point Likert scale (1 being
the least important, 5 being the most important) to imply the importance of a link.
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Appendix J: Top 5 selections of different groups
Tahle 1 5Ton 5 qelections for R Te
1. # of Concurrently Used Procedures 1. Too Many Information Sources to Make an Assessment
2. Too Many Redundant Control Devices 2. Level of Assessment Effort
3. Level of Assessment Effort 3. Too Many Procedures
4. Amount of Inoperable Equipment 4. # of Concurrently Used Procedures
5. Cognitive Fatigue 5. Inadequate Procedures
1. Time Constraints 1. Inadequate Communication
2. Too Many Information Sources to Make an Assessment 2. Too Many External Interruptions
3. Too Many Procedures 3. Inadequate Simulator Training
4. Ambient Noise Level 4. Too Many Alarms
5. Too Many Alarms 5. Inadequate Procedures
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1. Inaccurate Simulator Training
2. Volume of Information (in displays or panels) 2. Too Many Information Sources to Make anAssessment
3. Too Many Control Devices Shared by Different 3. Too Many Alarms
Systems
4. Inaccurate Simulator Training 4. Inadequate Simulator Training
5. Amount of Malfunctioning Equipment 5. Variety of Colors Used for Functional Groupings
1. Control Room Layout 1. Too Few Information Sources to Make anAssessment
2. Volume of Information (in displays or panels) 2. # of Concurrently Used Procedures
3. Variety of Control Devices 3. Too Many Operational Mode Transitions
4. Time Constraints 4. Amount of Malfunctioning Equipment
5. Clutter (in displays or panels) 5. Inadequate Procedures
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1. Too Many Alarms
for ' Onerntorq (01 -3)
1. Inadequate Communication
2. Too Many External Interruptions 2. Too Many Alarms
3. Volume of Information (in displays or panels) 3. Too Many External Interruptions
4. Too Many Alarms 4. Shift Length
5. Control Room Layout
1. Volume of Information (in displays or panels)
2. Amount of Malfunctioning Equipment
3. Too Many Alarms
4. # of Concurrently Used Procedures
5. Too Many External Interruptions
5. Volume of Information (in displays or panels)
195
1. Amount of Malfunctioning Equipment
Table 17. Top 5 selections for 3 Reviewers (R1-3).
RI R2
1. Too Many External Interruptions 1. Control Room Layout
2. Amount of Inoperable Equipment 2. Years Experience in Same Control Room
3. Time Constraints 3. Stress
4. # of Concurrently Used Procedures 4. Time Constraints
5. Stress 5. Cognitive Fatigue
1. Inadequate Procedures
2. Inadequate Simulator Training
3. Cognitive Fatigue
4. Time Constraints
5. Inadequate Communication
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18. Ton 5 selections for 6 researchers-
1. Volume of Information (in displays or panels) 1. Inadequate Procedures
2. Amount of Malfunctioning Equipment 2. Too Many Alarms
3. Too Many Alarms 3. Inadequate Communication
4. # of Concurrently Used Procedures 4. Clutter (in displays or panels)
5. Too Many External Interruptions 5. Variety of HSI Panels
1. Inadequate Procedures 1. Conflicting Procedures
2. Too Few Crew Members Available 2. Inadequate Simulator Training
3. Time Constraints 3. Cognitive Fatigue
4. Level of Assessment Effort 4. # of Concurrently Used Procedures
5. Too Few Information Sources to Make an Assessment 5. Inaccurate Simulator Training
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1. Inadequate Simulator Training
2. Too Few Information Sources to Make an Assessment 2. Level of Assessment Effort
3. Inadequate Communication 3. Time Constraints
4. Inadequate Procedures 4. Inadequate Procedures
5. Too Many Alarms 5. Cognitive Fatigue
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1. Inadequate Simulator Training
Appendix K: Stakeholder Groups' Identified Sources
Too Many
Information
Sources to
Make an
Assessment
Amount of
Malfunctioning
Equipment
Time
Constraints
Inadequate #Concurrently Volume of Too Many
2 procedures Procures Information External
___Procedures_ Interruptions
3 Available time Too Many Too Many Control Room
Alarms Alarms Layout
Number of Volume of Too Many Inadequate
4 external Information External Procedures
interruptions Interruptions
Number of Inadequate Inadequate5 inoperable Simulator Communication Stress
modules Training
Inadequate Level of Inaccurate6 communication Assessment Shift Length Simulator
Effort Training
Number of # of Amount of
7 parallel Time Concurrently Inoperable
procedures Constraints Used EquipmentProcedures
Years
8 Number of Too Many Experience increw members Procedures Same Control
Room
Number of Too Few
years of Information Cognitive9 experience in Sources to Fatigue
same control Make an
room Assessment
# of
10 Information Control Room Concurrentlyamount Layout Used
Procedures
Number of
procedures, Inadequate11 Number of Inadequcateo
team hierarchy Communication
levels
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Stress
Number o
simulator hours
completed per
operator
Too Many
Redundant
Control Devices
Number of Too Many
13 malfunctioning External
modules Interruptions
Incorrect
14 simulations, Variety ofNumber of Control Devices
alarms
Number of Too Many
15 steps in Operational
procedures Mode
________________ Transitions ________
Fatigue, Too Many
Number of Control Devices
16 information Shared by
sources per Different
inference Systems
Control room Malfunctioning
Equipments
Number of
18 required Inadequateinferences per Procedures
procedure
Conflicting
procedures,
Number of
years of Amount of
19working with Aountabof
19 the same crew Inoperale
(team
familiarity),
Variety of
procedures
Number of
control devices,
20 Number of Ambient Noisecrew members Level
required for
each procedure
Distance
between
21 displays,
Variety of
alarms
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Number of
collaborative
22 procedures,Number of
procedure
switches
23 Number ofdisplays
Ambient noise
level, Clutter,
24 Number of
redundant
control devices
Control room
25 size, Numberof inferences
per step
Duration
between steps,
Frequency of
operational
mode
transitions,
Number of
critical events
in the last shift,
26 Number of
dependent
procedures,
Number of
operational
mode
transitions,
Number of
shared control
devices
Display size,
Distance
between
27 control devices,Distance
between
control devices
and displays
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Appendix L: Node-Weight Contribution of Sources
Table 19. Percenta e of contribution for environmental comlexity sources
Contribution
Percentage
0.18
0.90
5.62
0
0.12
0.12
0.12
5.20
0.24
12.48%
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Table 20. Percentage of contribution for cognitive complexity sources
Cognitive Complexity Cont ton
Number of years of experience in different control 0
rooms
Number of years of experience in same control 2.69
room
Number of years of working with the same crew 0.66(team familiarity)
Number of simulator hours completed per 2.21
operator
Boredom 0
Fatigue 1.02
Stress 35.30
Sum 41.87%
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izational complexit sources
Contribution
Percentag-e
2.27
0.66
0.12
3.17
0.42
0.66
10.75
0.42
0
0
0.78
1.14
0.18
0
0.12
0
1.02
0
0
2.81
0.54
2.27
0
1.19
3.88
32.38%
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Table 22. Percentage of contribution for interface complexity sources.
Interface Complexity CPntrcentge
Number of displays 0.30
Variety of displays 0
Display size 0.06
Display resolution 0
Display luminance 0
Number of animated display features 0
Number of shared displays 0
Number of redundant displays 0
Distance between displays 0.48
Number of control devices 0.54
Variety of control devices 0
Number of shared control devices 0.12
Number of redundant control devices 0.24
Number of inoperable modules 4.96
Number of malfunctioning modules 2.15
Distance between control devices 0.06
Distance between control devices and displays 0.06
Distance between controls and their associated 0displays
Clutter 0.24
Information amount 2.39
Number of alarms 1.19
Variety of alarms 0.48
Alarm duration 0
Variety of icons 0
Icon size 0
Variety of fonts 0
Font size 0
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Variety of colors 0
Number of visualizations 0
Text to graphics ratio 0
Refresh rate 0
Real-time update rate 0
Sum 13.26%
208
Appendix M: Source Rating Descriptive Analysis
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01I
2.6
3.1
2.95
3.1
3.2
3.3
2.9
3.55
3.1
3.3
3.5
3.65
4.25
3.1
3.25
3.5
3.3
2.65
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Im
2.7
3.1
2.8
3.6
3.6
2.75
3.1
0.55
3.3
3.05
4
3.8
2.7
4.25
3.8
3.7
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3.85
3.7
3.05
3.15
3.65
3.95
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